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INFLATION, MARKET FAILURES, AND ALGORITHMS
(THIS IS AN EARLY DRAFT. FEEDBACK WELCOME.)
Rory Van Loo*
ABSTRACT
Inflation is a problem of tremendous scale. But inflation itself is unlikely to cause
the greatest economic harm during inflationary periods. Instead, a more likely
source of devastation will be policymakers’ response to inflation. Their main
anti-inflation tools, most notably increasing interest rates, increase
unemployment and the risk of recessions. This Article argues that there is a
better approach. Rather than defaulting to interest rate hikes that harm markets,
policy makers should prioritize laws that lower prices while improving markets.
For decades, businesses have raised prices by manipulating consumers,
exercising monopoly power, and lobbying for laws that block competition.
Automated pricing algorithms have further enhanced businesses’ ability to
charge higher prices by exploiting consumer biases. Although those past market
failures did not cause the currently high levels of inflation, they create new
challenges and opportunities.
A key challenge is that in an era of automated pricing algorithms and market
failures, direct solutions to inflation, like the end of the war in the Ukraine, may
not bring the full level of lowered prices that would be otherwise expected.
Fortunately, market failures now also provide an inflation-fighting tool that
would not otherwise exist—like a piggy bank of market improvements that the
law can break open to offset some portion of inflation. Interest rate hikes would
surely still be needed, but to a lesser extent. Many of these market improvement
opportunities lie in existing administrative agency authority, while more could
be done through new legislation, such as a universal price transparency statute.
Moreover, these legal reforms are desirable independent of inflation because
they would improve efficiency, expand total wealth, and reduce inequality. Thus,
policymakers should resist the urge to rely too extensively on interest rate hikes
that bring impoverishment and should instead pursue legal rules that promote
prosperity. Doing so could even transform a grave crisis into a tremendous
economic opportunity.
* Professor of Law, Boston University; Affiliated Fellow, Yale Law School Information
Society Project. For formative early conversations and feedback, I am particularly indebted to
Yair Listokin. I am also grateful to Ian Ayres, David Walker, and Kathy Zeiler for invaluable
input. Joseph Brav, Allyson Brennan, Maria Cosma, Tess Cushing, Heather Flokos, Keenan
Hunt-Stone, Nicholas Massoni, Jane Murphy, and Sam Norum contributed excellent research.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4226318

2

Anti-Inflation Laws

[21-Jul-22

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4226318

21-Jul-22]

Anti-Inflation Laws

3

Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 3
I. The Theory: Why Improved Markets Can Lower Inflation ................................. 10
A. Some Policy Responses to Inflation Avoid Economic Harm ....................... 11
B. Market Laws Can Offset Inflation from Other Causes .................................. 12
C. Market Laws Can Complement Direct Solutions ............................................ 15
D. Policymakers Have Failed To Produce Efficient Laws .................................. 18
II. The Evidence: Market improvement laws Can Lower Inflation ........................ 19
A. Market Failures Significantly Raise Consumer Prices ..................................... 20
1. Price Transparency Market Failures............................................................ 20
2. Licensing Law Market Failures .................................................................... 22
3. Antitrust Market Failures .............................................................................. 24
B. Market Improvement Laws Can Work .............................................................. 27
1. Price Transparency Laws .............................................................................. 27
2. Removing Licensing Restrictions Can Lower Prices ............................... 30
3. Antitrust Reforms Can Lower Prices ......................................................... 30
III. Designing Anti-Inflation Laws ............................................................................... 33
A. A Framework for Choosing Inflation Laws ..................................................... 33
B. Integrating Market Improvement Laws into Inflation Policy ........................ 42
1. Creating New Laws........................................................................................ 42
2. Exercising Existing Authority More Aggressively .................................... 46
3. Encouraging Action....................................................................................... 48
Conclusion: Inflation as Opportunity .......................................................................... 49

INTRODUCTION
The dominant narrative surrounding inflation is that we must pick our
economic poison: high inflation or high interest rates. Doing nothing and
allowing high inflation to continue can cause economic volatility and leave
people poorer as wages fail to keep up.1 Unfortunately, the leading policy
response currently being deployed—increasing interest rates—also tends to be
economically harmful. The aim of interest rate hikes is to encourage less
spending, which brings down prices. However, lower spending levels also slow
1 There is a debate as to the extent and nature of harm resulting from inflation, but there is
little doubt that high levels of inflation come with risks. See, e.g., Yair Listokin & Daniel Murphy,
Macroeconomics and the Law, 15 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 377, 383 (2019) (“High inflation is costly
both because high (and volatile) inflation is associated with uncertainty over the value of
contracts, thereby reducing exchange and output in the economy, and because high inflation can
cause a reduction in the amount of labor or other factors of production supplied in the
economy.”); Hongyi Li & Heng-fu Zou, Inflation, Growth, and Income Distribution: A Cross-Country
Study, 3 ANNALS ECON. & FIN. 85, 87 (2002) (“When inflation is taking place, price rises tend
to run ahead of increases in money wages. Therefore, inflation leads to a shift of income away
from wage earners, and toward profits.”).
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down the economy and increases the chance of a recession.2 Rising interest rates
thus risk increasing poverty, eliminating jobs, and making households of all
income levels worse off.3
What if this choice between two poisons is framed incorrectly? This Article
argues that lawmakers and scholars have paid insufficient attention to a more
attractive policy tool for helping to reduce inflation: using legal authority to
correct market failures. Three categories of market failures are particularly
worthy of greater consideration. First, inflation policy conversations proceed
without considering how businesses have for decades manipulated customers
into paying higher prices on everything from mortgages to paper towels by
leveraging behavioral economics insights.4 Price transparency laws can help
consumers to find the best deals and thereby counteract that widespread price
manipulation.5 Second, another overlooked way to fix market failures would be
to remove excess licensing laws, which raise consumer prices by requiring
everyone from hair stylists to casket sellers to undergo training and pass an exam
before offering their services.6 Finally, scholars and policy makers have paid
greater attention to antitrust, but have dismissed them without analyzing the
institutional nuances of different types of antitrust intervention and how they
might fit into a broader anti-inflation toolkit.7
Note that tax increases, such as those in the Inflation Reduction Act, have a similar effect.
See, e.g., Inflation Reduction Actually, NPR PLANET MONEY (Aug. 19, 2022),
https://www.npr.org/transcripts/1118552609 (“The biggest way the Inflation Reduction Act
takes money out is through new taxes on big companies. This will pull back spending….”).
3 See, e.g., Jeanna Smialek, Fed Makes a New Playbook, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2022, at B1 (noting
that the “painful process [of rate increases] would ramp up the risk of a recession that would
cost jobs and shutter businesses.”).
4 See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of
Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1449 (1999) (“Pricing has become still another
method of manipulation.”); Jon D. Hanson; & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously:
The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 633, 748 (1999) (“[M]arket outcomes
frequently will be heavily influenced, if not determined, by the ability of one actor to control the
format of information, the presentation of choices, and, in general, the setting within which
market transactions occur.”) (providing numerous examples, including that “the manufacturer
of Campbell’s Soup knows, as an empirical fact, that placing soup cans out of alphabetical order
on store shelves will increase sales by exactly six percent” and “retailers, studying such research
as . . . the Effects of Music on Purchasing Behavior, can lower customer blink rates from the
normal average of thirty-two times a minute to a narcotic fourteen blinks a minute”).
5 See infra Part II.B. (summarizing the empirical literature on price increases and the law’s
ability to respond).
6 See Morris M. Kleiner & Alan B. Krueger, Analyzing the Extent and Influence of Occupational
Licensing on the Labor Market, 31 J. LAB. ECON. S179, S179 (2013) (estimating that such practices
raise prices paid by about 15%).
7 See Paul Krugman, Opinion, Why Are Progressives Hating on Antitrust?, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 18,
2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/18/opinion/biden-inflation-monopolyantitrust.html (observing that “linkage of monopoly power to inflation is facing vehement,
almost hysterical, criticism . . .”). For one of the leading recent academic calls for using antitrust
to fight inflation, see Hal Singer, Antitrust Should Be Used to Fight Inflation, Feb. 2, 2022,
2
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Importantly, successful legal reforms in each of these areas—price
transparency, government licensing, and antitrust—are desirable even in normal
times. They would overall increase efficiency, promote economic growth,
reduce economic inequality, and raise employment.8 Because these reforms
move markets toward what economic theory refers to as their “perfect”
equilibrium,9 they will be referred to below as market improvement laws.
Consequently, this Article argues that policy makers should prioritize addressing
whatever portion of inflation is possible through market improvement laws.10
Whether that amounts to reducing one point of inflation through market
improvements or ten points, and even if interest rates still need to be used in
addition to market improvement laws, the result would be some quantity less of
interest rate increases that have heavy economic costs.
Despite the economic appeal of market improvement laws, scholars and
lawmakers have almost completely ignored them in fighting inflation. The area
of market improvement laws that this Article argues is most immediately
promising—price transparency reforms—is not even part of those debates.
Although antitrust laws had their legislative moment in the spotlight in the
1970s,11 scholars dismissed the idea that they could be used to reduce inflation
based on many arguments that are not valid today, if they ever were.12 These
various objections are considered in greater depth below, but one common
argument is that inflation was not caused by market failures and thus it would
https://prospect.org/economy/antitrust-should-be-used-to-fight-inflation.
8 See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Rebecca Stone, Pricing Misperceptions: Explaining Pricing Structure in
the Cell Phone Service Market, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 430, 453–54 (2012) (discussing in
passing the regressive redistribution resulting from market failures related to behavioral
economics); Einer Elhauge, Essay, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267, 1267 (2016)
(summarizing the effects of improved antitrust on inequality); Rory Van Loo, Broadening Consumer
Law: Competition, Protection, and Distribution, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 211 (2019) (surveying the
literature and finding evidence that market failures related to consumer markets, including both
consumer protection and antitrust, may contribute significantly to economic inequality).
9 More specifically, perfect competition occurs when informed consumers make rational
choices in a market filled with many competing sellers, among other conditions. Of course,
despite the widespread use of this concept in modeling, it is widely recognized that perfection is
unattainable. On the influence and limits of this notion, which draws on the concept of the
widely influential concept of “perfect competition,” see Herbert Hovenkamp & Fiona Scott
Morton, Framing the Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 1843, 1854 (2020). The
terminology of “perfect competition” is not used below because legal scholars tend to associate
competition with antitrust, whereas the focus here is on other areas of law that advance related
goals.
10 The level of inflation is calculated merely by collecting information about the prices paid,
and thus these mechanisms for lowering prices can offset inflation even if the underlying market
failures did not cause the inflation in the first place. See infra Part I.
11 See Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 3, 88 Stat. 1706, 1708
(1974) (increasing fines and adding felony penalties for violations of the Sherman Act).
12 See, e.g., Milton Handler, Antitrust-Myth and Reality in an Inflationary Era, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV.
211, 222 (1975) (dismissing the idea of using antitrust to counteract inflation).
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be a mistake to look to market failures as a solution.13 However, that reasoning
would mean that we should not rely on interest rates to address all of inflation
either, since the war in Ukraine and supply-chain disruptions in China caused
much of the current inflation. Thus, by similar reasoning interest rates should
not be used either when they do not address the direct causes of inflation. Yet
despite the limits to such objections, similar arguments are being repeated today
to dismiss the idea of using antitrust.14 The real question should instead be what
will work to address inflation, which is calculated by collecting data about the
actual market prices people pay on various products throughout the country.
If win-win market improvement laws exist, why would so many observers
overlook and even dismiss their importance without engaging in a more nuanced
legal institutional analysis? Although politicization of the debate has surely
gotten in the way, conceptual barriers have also impeded a comprehensive law
and economics analysis. As a threshold matter, the scholarly inattention to
market improvement laws partly reflects intellectual silos. Economists, like legal
scholars, are not generalists. They focus on either macroeconomics or
microeconomics, and within those broad areas have further specializations.
Inflation lies in the domain of macroeconomics. Indeed, the leading alternatives
to interest rates that lawmakers have pursued are macroeconomic tools such as
taxes and federal spending, as demonstrated by the Inflation Reduction Act of
2022.15 Yet consumer law, antitrust, and other market improvement laws are the
domain of microeconomics.16 Further complicating matters, most legal scholars
engaging in economic analysis focus on microeconomics. Indeed, they pay such
little attention to macroeconomics that, as a descriptive matter, arguably “[l]aw
and economics should be called law and microeconomics.”17 Consequently,
most of the scholars best situated to design microeconomic market
improvement laws rarely pay attention to macroeconomic issues like inflation.18
See infra Parts I & III (analyzing the sources of resistance to antitrust and offering new
reasons why some skepticism is warranted).
14 See infra Parts I & III (analyzing the sources of resistance to antitrust and offering new
reasons why some skepticism is warranted).
15 See President Joseph Biden, Remarks by President Biden on the Inflation Reduction Act
of 2022 (July 28, 2022), (transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom/speeches-remarks/2022/07/28/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-inflation-reductionact-of-2022) (summarizing the legislation, whose main inflation components include tax
adjustments). The Act’s Medicare price negotiation provision is, however, microeconomic. Id.
As mentioned above, tax increases, like increasing interest rates, tend to have the effect of
slowing down the economy. See Inflation Reduction Actually, supra note 2.
16 See Yair Listokin, Law and Macro: What Took So Long?, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 141,
146 (2020).
17 See Yair Listokin, Law and Macroeconomics, OXFORD BUS. L. BLOG (Feb. 10, 2017),
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2017/02/law-and-macroeconomics; see also
YAIR LISTOKIN, LAW AND MACROECONOMICS: LEGAL REMEDIES TO RECESSIONS (2019)
(outlining the disconnect between macroeconomic approaches and legal scholarship).
18 See Listokin, supra note 16, at 147 (noting financial regulation as a rapidly changing
13
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These conceptual silos may help explain why the macroeconomic inflation
toolkit has not fully incorporated recent microeconomic evidence about market
failures. Inflation has not been a major problem in the U.S. since the early
1980s.19 Whereas in 1980 the average markup on goods sold in the United States
was 21% above cost, by 2016 that figure had reached 61%.20 This shift suggests
that there are now far greater opportunities for the law to improve markets than
there were in 1980. Since then, firms systematized behavioral economics insights
and big data to algorithmically manipulate consumers into paying higher prices.21
The portion of U.S. employees who need a license to legally work grew from
5% in the 1950s to almost 30% by 2013, thereby raising the average prices
people pay by about 15% on everything from cosmetology to funeral services.22
And over the last two decades, the average market concentration level increased
90%, meaning that a smaller number of companies now hold greater market
share throughout the economy.23 Although the consequences are disputed, the
leading studies have found growing market power over time.24
Thus, interest rates became the default anti-inflation tool in a prior world
with fewer market failures and when automated profit-maximizing algorithms
did not drive market prices. In 1980, when markups were only 21% above costs,
there may not have been much room to push prices lower while addressing
market failures, especially because some markup is needed above costs for a
exception); Mark Kelman, Could Lawyers Stop Recessions? Speculations on Law and Macroeconomics, 45
STAN. L. REV. 1215, 1216 (1993) (“When legal scholars and law students discuss the impact of
economics on their understanding of law, they invariably think about microeconomics, not
macroeconomics.”). A notable exception to this is financial regulation scholarship.
19 See, e.g., Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, Ken-Hou Lin, Financialization: Causes, Inequality
Consequences, and Policy Implications, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 167, 171 (2013) (stating that “one of
the central developments of the 1970s crisis era was… high inflation,” which was not “slowed”
until the “early 1980s”).
20 Jan De Loecker, Jan Eeckhout & Gabriel Unger, The Rise of Market Power and the
Macroeconomic Implications, 135 Q.J. ECON. 561, 562 (2020).
21 See Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 999 (2014)
(“[D]igitization of commerce dramatically alters the capacity of firms to influence consumers at
a personal level.”); Glenn Ellison & Sara Fisher Ellison, Search, Obfuscation, and Price Elasticities on
the Internet, 77 ECONOMETRICA 427, 428–29 (2009) (showing how online sellers can raise prices
6% to 9% by obfuscation of quality and shipping fees); infra Part II.A. (summarizing the
empirical literature establishing that such practices raise prices).
22 See Kleiner & Krueger, supra note 6, at S179. Also, the number of states granting auto
dealers the exclusive right to sell manufacturers’ cars in their territory—essentially state-granted
monopolies—increased from 27 in 1979 to all 50 today. Francine Lafontaine & Fiona Scott
Morton, Markets: State Franchise Laws, Dealer Terminations, and the Auto Crisis, 24 J. ECON. PERSP.
233, 240, tbl.A (2010).
23 See Gustavo Grullon, Yelena Larkin & Roni Michaely, Are US Industries Becoming More
Concentrated?, 23 REV. FIN. 697, 698 (2019) (finding also that more than 75% of U.S. industries
have increased in concentration).
24 See, e.g., id. at 698; De Loecker et al., supra note x (attributing rising margins over time to
market power). It is difficult to establish this relationship conclusively, due to empirical
limitations.
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business to survive.25 Thus, scholars’ dismissal of antitrust as a tool for
combatting inflation in the 1970s and 1980s, the last time the issue received
significant attention, may have made more sense then.26
Considering the growing evidence of market failures in the past few decades,
however, and the dramatic markup increase to 61% over costs, the underlying
assumptions made in 1980 about inflation are outdated.27 Market improvement
laws now have significantly more potential to reduce inflation than they did
before, especially when the concerns are about levels of inflation of about 8%
or 9% annually—levels that are significantly smaller than the increase in
markups.28 Yet instead of starting with anti-inflation tools that increase
prosperity and lower inequality, lawmakers have allowed the country to rely
mostly on interest rate increases that lower prosperity for all and increase
inequality, as they did in the 1970s and 1980s. Legal scholars have also not
turned their attention to the connection between market failures and inflation
in any sustained manner.29 In short, there is an absence of sustained effort to
update the anti-inflation policy paradigm to the modern markup economy.
To reach the conclusion that microeconomic market improvement laws
deserve greater attention in macroeconomic inflation policy toolkit, this Article
provides a sustained analysis of the theory and evidence. It shows why many of
the main reservations about market improvement laws can be addressed with a
more comprehensive legal and economic institutional analysis. It also offers a
framework for analyzing inflation laws that shows why many of the dismissals
of market improvement laws rest on an incomplete economic picture.
Although a comprehensive economic cost-benefit analysis anti-inflation
framework has many components, one of the most essential is giving greater
weight to the side effects that inflation policies have on the economy beyond
inflation. Once the side effects are not assumed to be inevitably negative, and
are given greater weight, it becomes difficult to justify ignoring market
improvement laws that advance both total wealth and distributional goals.
Regardless of the magnitude of their impact on inflation, such laws should be
the highest priority largely because the government should prioritize them
regardless of their impact on inflation. Whatever portion of interest rate
increases they prevent would save the economy from damage that does not need
to happen.
25 Even some markup above marginal cost is generally assumed to be necessary. See, e.g.,
Ellison & Ellison, supra note 21, at 428–29 (assuming several percentage points of profit above
marginal cost before calculating supracompetitive price levels).
26 See Handler, supra note 12, at 213.
27 Infra Part I.
28 On levels of inflation, see Gabriel T. Rubin, U.S. Inflation Hits New Four-Decade High of
9.1%, WALL ST. J., July 14, 2022, at A1.
29 Some economists have begun to turn their attention to the connection between antitrustrelated issues and inflation, although even those analyses do not consider the area of market
improvement laws that this Article shows is the most promising.
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Another key factor in an anti-inflation framework that has received
insufficiently nuanced analysis is administrability. Once administrability is
analyzed more fully, for example, it becomes clear that the market improvement
laws that have defined past debates—especially antitrust laws that would address
oligopoly industries—suffer from major limitations that other market
improvement laws do not. For instance, the most significant antitrust remedy
for reducing monopoly power—breaking up large companies—typically takes
years to implement and costs the broken-up firm billions of dollars to
complete.30 Thus, lower prices from breakups may not materialize for years and
could even weaken supply chains at a time when the opposite is needed.
In contrast, price transparency laws are better situated to create a fast
reduction in prices. For example, consider a 2013 Israeli law that required stores
to make their price information available in machine-readable form.31 That law
was aimed at allowing third-party price comparison tools to help consumers
locate the best prices.32 Within eight months of that law’s enactment, prices had
begun to decline, and within two years of the law’s enactment prices lowered by
an average of 4% to 5%.33 Price transparency laws may even overall act on prices
faster than an increase in interest rates.34
The point here is not that antitrust law should be ignored as an anti-inflation
tool. Indeed, some areas of antitrust law could have a quicker effect on pricing,
such as investigations into price fixing.35 It is also possible that price
transparency laws with faster price effects might be accompanied by antitrust
remedies whose impact will take a few years, thereby offering a more enduring
market improvement package for lowering inflation.
Instead, the point is that a more in-depth consideration of administrability
shows how structural antitrust interventions may be less immediately helpful
than other market improvement laws. Additionally, since these difficult-toadminister antitrust laws have dominated consideration of market improvement
laws, the focus on them negatively skews perceptions of the extent to which
market improvement laws should be considered in fighting inflation.36
30 Rory Van Loo, In Defense of Breakups: Administering a “Radical” Remedy, 105 CORNELL L.
REV. 1955, 1986 (2020).
31 Itai Ater & Oren Rigbi, The Effects of Mandatory Disclosure of Supermarket Prices 1
(Oct.
2,
2017)
(draft
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3046703.
32 Id.
33 Id. This law illustrates a larger set of commercial laws that could help consumers to better
locate the best deals—or at least to pressure firms into offering lower prices out of concern that
the transparency will drive away customers if the business does not lower prices. For other
examples, see infra Part II.
34 See infra Part III.A.
35 See Infra Part III. Note that this difficulty in administering refers to inflation purposes,
not the administrability for antitrust purposes. On the latter, see Van Loo, supra note 30.
36 More precisely, governmental efforts have prioritized antitrust and scholarly
conversations have ignored other areas of market improvement laws. See infra Part I.
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These dynamics speak to a final institutional implication. Limited
governmental resources and a dysfunctional legislative process mean that
Congress and other governmental leaders do not implement every important
policy that should exist on the merits. Yet the threat of a recession is a wellknown way to break political impasse.37 Consequently, inflation could provide
the means to enact market improvement laws that will leave the economy better
off than when inflation began its precipitous rise. Responding to inflation with
an emphasis on market improvement laws therefore channels the wisdom that
policymakers should “never let a crisis go to waste.”38 Counterintuitively,
inflation can be reframed as offering an opportunity to increase prosperity.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains the theory behind why
market improvement laws can help to combat inflation. In so doing, it addresses
common objections to looking beyond interest rates. Part II reviews the
evidence that market failures drive up prices, and that legal reforms can bring
them back down. Part III offers several concrete suggestions for reform, ranging
from a universal price transparency statute to inflation impact statements. It also
sketches a framework for choosing among inflation policies. That framework
shows the potential to build an anti-inflation toolkit rooted not in weakening
the economy, but in strengthening it.
I. THE THEORY: WHY IMPROVED MARKETS CAN LOWER INFLATION
Economic theory alone cannot determine the best anti-inflation policy. But
theory is important, particularly because empirical evidence is almost always
insufficient to dispositively prove that any one policy choice is optimal.39 Several
theoretical considerations provide essential foundational support for the
possibility of using market improvement laws to counter inflation. The theory
behind relying on interest rates tends to fail to recognize that (1) some antiinflation policies avoid economic harm; (2) market improvement laws can offset
inflation from even unrelated other causes, such as wars, (3) market
improvement laws can complement direct inflation efforts; and (4) efficiency
considerations alone have not produced all beneficial market laws. Each of these
oversights will be taken in turn, in the process laying the theoretical foundations
for a more comprehensive anti-inflation framework.

See generally POLICY SHOCK: RECALIBRATING RISK AND REGULATIONS AFTER OIL
SPILLS, NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS AND FINANCIAL CRISES (Edward J. Balleisen, Lori S. Bennear,
Kimberly D. Krawiec & Jonathan B. Wiener eds., 2017) (summarizing the interplay between
crises and legislation); but see .
38 CHARLES C. DOYLE, WOLFGANG MIEDER & FRED. R. SHAPIRO, THE DICTIONARY OF
MODERN PROVERBS 45 (2012).
39 See generally POLICY SHOCK, supra note 37 (outlining the challenges of policy making and
difficulties in assessing underlying risks).
37
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A. Avoiding Economic Harm Should Be a Priority
When inflation skyrocketed in the 1970s, an event sometimes called the
“Great Inflation,” a period of price controls followed.40 Most aggressively, in
1971, President Nixon issued an executive order freezing wages, rents, and
prices for 90 days.41 That shock briefly decreased inflation, but by the mid-1970s
those freezes had contributed to a recession and failed to tame inflation.42
Because they did not contain inflation, and because it is believed that they
“eventually lead to the destruction of the free enterprise system,”43 price controls
became a heavily disfavored tool for fighting inflation.44
Compared to price controls, interest rates are a more appealing tool because
they leave intact markets’ ability to set prices based on supply and (reduced)
demand rather than a government-commanded price. However, interest rate
adjustments still distort markets by causing a retraction in spending.45 That raises
the question of whether an alternative response to inflation exists that would
have less dire consequences.
Policymakers considered such an option in the 1970s, when lawmakers
passed legislation strengthening antitrust and the FTC deployed its authority
more aggressively.46 It is difficult to know what effect these reforms had on
See Yair Listokin & Daniel Murphy, Macroeconomics and the Law, 15 ANN. REV. L. & SOC.
SCI. 377, 392 (2019) (“[T]he initial response to the Great Inflation of the 1970s in the United
States was an extraordinarily intrusive legal regime of price controls.”).
41 Exec. Order No. 11,615, 36 Fed. Reg. 15,727 (Aug. 17, 1971). There were some
exceptions. Id.
42 See R. Randall Kelso, Narcissism, Generation X, the Corporate Elite, and the Religious Right
Within the Modern Republican Party: A Set of "Friendly" Observations for President Bush, 24 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1971, 2022 (2003) (“By interfering with the regular functioning of the market system,
wage and price controls harm long-term economic growth.”); Listokin & Murphy, supra note 40,
at 392 (“These price controls reduced inflation briefly but ultimately caused so much economic
harm that they could not be sustained.”).
43 MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 135 (40th anniversary ed. 2002).
44 See ROBERT L. SCHUETTINGER & EAMONN F. BUTLER, FORTY CENTURIES OF WAGE
AND PRICE CONTROLS: HOW NOT TO FIGHT INFLATION 3 (1979); Note, Price and Sovereignty,
135 HARV. L. REV. 755, 761 (2021) (“Price controls represent not just an inadequate solution to
inflation and other social problems, they also signal the success of a conception of popular
sovereignty anathema to the freedom of and through the market prized by neoliberalism.”); Ben
Casselman & Jeanna Smialek, Price Controls Set Off Heated Debate as History Gets a Second Look, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 13, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/13/business/economy/inflationprice-controls.html (reporting results from a survey of economists) (“Artificially holding down
prices leads to shortages, inefficiencies or other unintended consequences, like an increase in
black-market activity.”). When used to address market failures, however, this antipathy for price
controls does not hold.
45 See, e.g., Frederic S. Mishkin, Is the Fisher Effect for Real?: A Reexamination of the Relationship
Between Inflation and Interest Rates, 30 J. MONETARY ECON. 195, 213 (1992) (summarizing the
challenges of rate increases).
46 Donald I. Baker, Restating Law and Refining Remedies: The Trading Company Act, the Joint
Research Act, and the Local Government Antitrust Act, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 499 (1986). For examples,
40
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inflation.47 Nonetheless, one point is particularly important to recognize,
because it speaks to the possibility of using market improvement laws today.
Unlike with price controls and interest rate increases, there is no strong evidence
that the increase in antitrust enforcement in the 1970s harmed the economy.
Instead, there are good reasons, based in theory and evidence, to think that it
may have improved the economy.48 Accordingly, critics of using antitrust to
combat inflation instead raised other objections that the following sections will
address.
B. Market Interventions Help Even If One-off and Unrelated to Inflation’s Causes
One of the main sources of resistance to using antitrust to combat inflation,
both in the 1970s and more recently, is that shortcomings in competition did
not create inflation.49 As a result, even in the best-case scenario, antitrust
solutions leave in place the structural causes of inflation.50 That means that
antitrust, and by extension market improvement laws more broadly, are one-off
while inflation occurs on an ongoing basis. To elaborate, structural inflation is
inflation produced by influences on supply and demand that are beyond the
consumer’s control.51 For instance, when gas or grain supplies shrink due to the
Russia-Ukraine war, there is a real increase in cost because the supply has been
lowered, and price is the product of supply and demand. Additionally, a potential
structural demand-side contributor is an increase in the supply of money, such
see Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 3, 88 Stat. 1706, 1708 (1974)
(making some violations of the Sherman Act a felony and increasing fine); William E. Kovacic,
“Competition Policy in Its Broadest Sense”: Michael Pertschuk’s Chairmanship of the Federal Trade
Commission 1977-1981, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1269, 1269 (2019) (“[T]hrough the 1970s, the
Federal Trade Commission . . . expanded the focus of antitrust enforcement . . . .”).
47 Tomaskovic-Devey & Lin, supra note 19, at 171.
48 This issue is not easy to rigorously study, making it difficult to draw strong conclusions,
but see JONATHAN B. BAKER, THE ANTITRUST PARADIGM: RESTORING A COMPETITIVE
ECONOMY 2-3 (2019) (seeing economic benefits in stronger antitrust enforcement of the 1970s).
49 See Handler, supra note 12, at 222 (stating that those proposing to combat inflation with
antitrust assume that “the deficiencies of antitrust—substantive, procedural, remedial and
enforcement-related—have combined to contribute to our present economic woes.”). Law
professor Ramsi Woodcock recently deployed this reasoning. See Ramsi Woodcock, Antitrust
Can’t Tame Inequality, Let Alone Inflation, THE HILL (Jan. 28, 2022),
https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/591609-antitrust-legislation-cant-tame-inequality-letalone-inflation (“But . . . can [antitrust] at least tame inflation? The answer is: not by much
because everyone agrees that a major cause of the present inflation is supply chain disruption . .
. .”). Although this Article comes to a different conclusion than Woodcock, his qualification of
“not by much” alludes to the limits of antitrust empirics speaking to magnitude, explored in
greater depth infra Part II.
50 See, e.g., Woodcock, supra note 49.
51 See Julio H. G. Olivera, On Structural Inflation and Latin-American ‘Structuralism’, OXFORD
ECON. PAPERS 321, 322-24 (1964) (explaining structural inflation as a function of supply and
demand).
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as through a government stimulus package, which can demand because people
have a greater capacity to spend.52 Critics have thus argued that antitrust is an
inadequate response to inflation because it can only be used once and does not
address the inflation’s ongoing structural causes.53
The core propositions in this reasoning are correct as applied to market
improvement laws. Market failures did not necessarily cause inflation, and thus
improving markets may leave in place the excess demand and supply chain
issues.54 However, interest rate changes do not directly address the bulk of
inflation’s structural causes either, such as supply chain shortcomings and the
Ukraine war.55
Perhaps the most generous way to view this critique is as speaking to the
perceived comprehensiveness of the solution. Since market failures did not
cause inflation, after the desired market improvements are achieved, prices
could not be reduced further because businesses cannot sell below cost for
sustained periods. Yet because market failures did not cause the inflation, some
level of inflation may still remain. Accordingly, once market improvement laws
reach their limits in addressing market failures, they also reach a ceiling for
lowering inflation. In contrast, at least in theory, interest rates can be increased
indefinitely over a span of many years.56
This concern ultimately speaks to the issues of magnitude and timing. A
threshold observation is that because most conversations focus on antitrust, the
magnitude of price reduction assumed to be possible is less than it would be if
the array of legal reforms considered also included price transparency laws and
reduced occupational licensing. If each of these areas can lower prices by two
percentage points, together they can combat far more inflation than any one of
them could individually.
Thus, the magnitude question depends on how far market improvement
laws can lower prices relative to existing inflation levels. Part II will explore the
52 See id. at 324. Note that an increase in money supply need not increase inflation if, for
example, it is accompanied by a lower velocity of money changing hands.
53 See, e.g., Handler, supra note 12, at 222-24 (observing the mismatch between antitrust and
inflation).
54 It is possible, if not likely, that some companies are increasing inflation by raising prices
more than necessary while using structural inflation as cover. But that does not appear to be the
main cause of inflation, and thus the skepticism is warranted.
55 For instance, interest rates cannot fix the effects of pandemics or wars on supply, which
is thought to be responsible for most of the current inflation. James Mackintosh, War, Pandemic,
Inflation: Markets Struggle When Narratives Collide, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 2022, at B12. Thus, to
dismiss market improvement laws because they do not address the structural roots of inflation
while allowing interest rates to be used to address all of inflation would be a policy-making
double standard—or it would paralyze the government’s ability to respond to inflation if that
standard is consistently applied. It is also worth noting that both interest rates and some market
improvement laws both seek to influence consumer behavior, albeit in different ways.
56 In reality, there would be practical limits imposed by the resulting harms to the economy
and society by extreme freezes in investment.
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empirical evidence of the potential magnitude of price reduction in each of these
areas, but as a theoretical exercise, consider again how the average markup on
goods sold in the United States rose from 21% in 1980 to 61% by 2016.57
Inflation between June of 2021 and June of 2022 was about 9%, well above the
target of 2%.58 Thus, in theory, antitrust could eliminate the additional 7
percentage points of excess inflation by addressing competition failures that had
previously contributed to the rise of markups to 61%, even though that rise did
not cause the current inflation crisis. To rigorously analyze the potential role of
market improvement laws as a response to inflation, it is necessary to recognize
that the shifts occurring over the past few decades created opportunities to
significantly lower prices before inflation ever became a problem.
The second common shortcoming of the skeptics’ position is that they fail
to appreciate the potential long-term effects on inflation that even short-term
market interventions could have. A series of one-time interventions could offset
inflation for multiple years. To return to the example above, holding all else
constant, if market improvement laws lowered prices by 18 percentage points
total over three years—an average of 6 points each year—it would still leave the
average industry markup well above the 21% markup that existed in 1980.59
More importantly, even if market improvement laws were unable to reduce
inflation beyond those three years, they could nonetheless have the effect of
preventing longer term inflation. The reason for this is that some of the
structural causes of inflation may require only a few years to fix. For example,
the war in the Ukraine, labor shortages, and the supply-chain constraints from
lockdowns in China have contributed significantly to inflation but may require
two or three years to resolve. If market-oriented price reductions offset the price
effects of some of those temporary structural contributors to inflation, they
could reduce inflation until those direct structural causes can be resolved. At a
minimum, this gap-filling by market improvement laws could tame inflation
without causing a recession, as would be expected with increased interest rates.
The gap-filling effect can also offer longer term protections because
inflation can result from purely psychological factors rather than any structural
cause.60 In other words, even if there is no shortage of supply or increase in
De Loecker et al., supra note 20, at 562.
Rubin, supra note 28, at A1.
59 To calculate the effect on markups, one cannot solely subtract the percentage points. To
take a simplified static approach, this can be calculated as (1 - .18) * 1.61 = 1.32, meaning that
the new markup above costs is about 32%. This is a greatly simplified static analysis offered for
the sake of illustration. The point for now is not that such a reduction is possible. Instead, the
point is simply to demonstrate that there is a theoretical possibility, based on the data available,
that antitrust could have a sustained and significant multi-year impact on inflation even if
competition failures had nothing to do with causing inflation.
60 See, e.g., Edgar R. Fiedler, The Price-Wage Stabilization Program, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON
ECON. ACTIVITY 199, 200 (1972) (“During that period the economy entered a cost-push
inflation—a spiral of rising wages and prices, based not on union or corporate market power,
57
58
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demand, prices can go up (or stay up) if people expect inflation.61 For instance,
if there are widespread rumors that inflation will happen, many consumers might
decide to quickly purchase large amounts of goods at the current price. The
sudden spike in demand will drive up prices, further stoking fears of inflation.62
Consequently, market improvement laws can guard against longer term, selffulfilling inflation by preventing the expectation of inflation from ever being
established in consumers’ minds—even if the direct impact on prices from
market improvement laws only lasts one or two years as a gap-filler until
structural causes of inflation can be resolved.
In short, it is a logical fallacy to require that inflationary solutions directly
address the causes of inflation or have the potential to address the entirety of
inflation in order to be considered. The more important question is whether
market improvement laws can help meaningfully ameliorate inflation. At a
minimum, since the direct causes of the current inflation are potentially shortterm, dismissing solutions that may also only be short-term makes little sense.
And as a matter of basic economics, even if market failures made no
contribution to the present rise in inflation, market improvement laws can still
offset inflation caused by other factors.63
C. Market Failures and Algorithmic Pricing Are Relevant to Direct Solutions
There is a certain irony in criticism that market improvement laws do not
address the structural causes of inflation. Those critiques have overlooked a key
feature of market improvement laws. Such laws have a potentially important
supportive role to help address inflation’s direct causes. That supportive role
may be especially important in an era of algorithmic pricing and widespread
market failures.
To have their full impact, direct solutions may depend on market
improvement laws. Assume that structural shocks—such as China’s COVID-19
shutdown, which deprived factories of workers—increase prices by 10
percentage points, but only for a year or two. If consumers are not discerning
enough to choose sellers who quickly adjust prices downward after that shock
has passed, then what could have been a temporary price hike can become a
sustained price increase because consumers, on autopilot, are continuing to
purchase as before or expecting prices to continue rising. Temporarily high
but on the widely and deeply ingrained expectations of endless rapid inflation that were being
cemented into the institutional framework within which price and wage decisions are made in
our economy.”).
61 See id. at 200.
62 See Franklin Shupp, Optimal Control, Uncertainty and a Temporary Incomes Policy, PROC. OF
THE 1972 IEEE CONF. ON DECISION AND CONTROL AND 11TH SYMP. ON ADAPTIVE
PROCESSES 21, 21 (citing expectation of price increases as the driving force behind certain kinds
of inflation).
63 See Richard S. Markovits, An Ideal Antitrust Law Regime, 64 TEX. L. REV. 251, 266 (1985).
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inflation may thus condition consumers to expect ongoing high levels of
inflation.
Price transparency laws are perhaps uniquely situated among legal reforms
to eliminate this potential psychological contribution to inflation. Antitrust
alone cannot fix this problem, because consumers need to be able to understand
and locate low prices to provide competing businesses with sufficient incentives
to offer them.64 If consumers can quickly understand that the structural increases
in costs amount to only 4 percentage points, a 10% price increase should arouse
their suspicions and drive them to look for a better deal. Consumers would
thereby reward sellers offering lower prices by seeking them out rather than
assuming such sellers do not exist.65 Increasing consumers’ accuracy in
understanding prices may therefore be necessary for direct solutions to lessen
the level of inflation fully.
Market improvement laws may also directly contribute to addressing
inflation before structural solutions even arise. Structural and psychological
factors can combine to contribute to high levels of inflation. 66 For instance, if
there are structural reasons for an additional price increase of 2 or 3 percentage
points, people may expect the impact to be even higher, such as 8 percentage
points. Moreover, the rapid changes in price mean that prices learned in past
shopping trips are no longer relevant. Consequently, assessing current prices
becomes more cognitively difficult. The research on behavioral economics
suggests that the greater the cognitive load, the easier it is for sellers to charge
anticompetitively higher prices.67 As a result, consumers may have more
difficulty determining the true competitive price during inflationary times.
Businesses would be expected to exploit these consumer expectations and
cognitive limits. Unfortunately, that issue has become politicized, as if the whole
See, e.g., OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT 26 (2012) (summarizing behavioral
economics pricing dynamics that operate independently of traditional measures of competition);
Kelman, supra note 18, at 1263-64 (“Monopolists . . . might quickly realign prices after [a
demand] shock to maximize revenues. The risk-averse, imperfectly competitive firm . . . may
find it preferable to maintain historical mark-ups . . . .”) (“It is not apparent . . . how antitrust
enforcement could counteract the sorts of oligopolistic structures most likely to exhibit
atypically high levels of price rigidity.”); infra Part II.
65 Ryan McCauley, Breaking A Monopoly: Vigilante Justice or the Sort of Innovative Approach We
Celebrate?, 24 COMPETITION: J. ANTI. & UNFAIR COMP. L. SEC. St. B. Cal. 76, 76 (2015)
(explaining that increased consumer consumption of lower prices encourages low price levels).
66 See, e.g., Janet L. Yellen, Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Inflation
Dynamics and Monetary Policy (Sept. 24, 2015) (“Today, many economists believe that these
features of inflation in the late 1960s and 1970s—its high level and lack of a stable anchor—
reflected a combination of factors, including . . . the emergence of an inflationary psychology
whereby a rise in actual inflation led people to revise their expectations for future inflation.
Together, these factors caused inflation . . . to ratchet higher over time.”).
67 See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477 (1998) (providing an overview of the behavioral
economics research on consumers’ cognitive limitations); infra Part II.
64
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problem of inflation can be reframed as “greedflation.”68 But once this
conversation moves away from such framing, the idea that businesses would
charge the highest prices possible simply restates the basics of how markets
work.69 Furthermore, managers arguably have a fiduciary duty to charge the
highest prices legally possible in order to maximize shareholder value, or would
see themselves as having such a duty.70
Managers may not ever even consciously decide to capitalize on inflation or
be aware that such behavior is occurring. Many prices are set by automated
algorithms instructed to maximize profits.71 An effective algorithm following
those instructions would be expected to exploit whatever confusion arises from
inflation, whether the manager knew that was happening. It is possible that
whereas managers observing lowered costs as inflation subsides would lower
prices assuming that consumers would expect such adjustments, algorithms
would only do so once the consumers show, through market behavior, that they
expect lower prices. Indeed, in theory, the algorithm could even learn from an
inflationary period that prices could be more rapidly raised and encourage
continued price increases. In other words, the algorithm would be trained to
encourage inflation. Inflation would thereby become an algorithmically
reinforced phenomenon. Although the research on automated pricing
algorithms is still nascent, but there is evidence that these algorithms tend to
increase prices significantly.72
At a minimum, policy makers would ideally consider the possible effects of
algorithms on inflation. An anti-inflation toolkit that fails to consider the
possible changes to inflation introduced by algorithmic pricing could produce
more muted price reductions than in prior eras. That would necessitate even
greater interest rate cuts to achieve the same level of price reduction as in the
past, meaning more economic harm would be caused and an increased risk of
recession. It follows that, in theory, market improvement laws that improve
consumers’ ability to advance their interests in the face of algorithmic pricing
could prove to be a valuable tool in either avoiding algorithmically enhanced
inflation or in getting more of an anti-inflation effect from addressing the
See Lydia DePillis, Is ‘Greedflation’ Rewriting Economics, or Do Old Rules Still Apply?, N.Y.
TIMES (June 3, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/03/business/economy/pricegouging-inflation.html.
69 See, e.g., Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and
Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q.J. ECON. 505, 506–07 (2006) (showing why
strategic pricing practices).
70 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply
to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1445 (1993).
71 See, e.g., Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L.J. 1267, 1292 (2017)
("[D]digital intermediaries run tests year-round to identify which algorithms earn higher
profits."); Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E. Stucke, Artificial Intelligence & Collusion: When
Computers Inhibit Competition, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1775 (exploring antitrust issues of
algorithmic pricing).
72 See Infra Part II.
68
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original causes of inflation.73
Economic theory thus shows how effective market laws helping people to
assess costs can be a crucial part of addressing structural inflation now that it is
recognized that consumers are not perfectly rational. Without such laws, there
is a risk that perceptions of inflation—and businesses’ inevitable efforts to
exploit those perceptions—will cause inflation to endure long after the original
structural contributors have ended.
D. Policymakers Have Failed To Produce Efficient Laws
One final theoretical issue can be seen in the skepticism about using market
improvement laws against inflation. The skeptics implicitly assume that little or
nothing more can be done to improve markets.74 That assumption might seem
sensible at first glance because an independent basis exists for market
improvement laws: efficiency. Efficiency has long been one of the most
powerful influences in designing the law.75 Since market improvement laws
already have such a persuasive intellectual cornerstone pushing them forward, it
is understandable why observers might posit that the extra motivation added by
inflation would be inconsequential. After all, if there are legal rules that would
move markets toward perfection, they would improve efficiency and thus they
would be expected to already exist.
If this assumption were true, lawmakers would have already passed up-todate price transparency and antitrust laws and would have previously removed
any excess governmental licensing. Under this assumption, the DOJ and FTC
would also already have all the authority, resources, rationality, and motivation
necessary to prevent price increases due to market failures. In such a world,
there would be no additional room for legal reforms to push prices down and
meaningfully address inflation.
However, that assumption is suspect. There is a rich literature establishing
that laws are not passed as a result of a rational process that reflects society’s
best interests.76 Laws are instead the product of a messy set of interest group
See infra Part II.
That assumption is implied by the logic that because competition failures did not cause
inflation, market improvement laws cannot combat it. See supra Part I.B.
75 See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897)
(observing economic efficiency as a value emphasized by the law); Alan Schwartz & Louis L.
Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127
U. PA. L. REV. 630, 668 (1979) (stressing efficiency as a priority for market regulation); Jedediah
Britton-Purdy, David Singh Grewal, Amy Kapczynski & K. Sabeel Rahman, Building A Law-andPolitical-Economy Framework: Beyond the Twentieth-Century Synthesis, 129 YALE L.J. 1784, 1789–90
(2020) (remarking on and critiquing the powerful influence of efficiency).
76 For prominent examples and applications of this vast literature, see JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 16-18 (1980); JERRY L.
MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC
LAW 81-105 (1997); see also DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II (1989) (summarizing public
73
74
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advocacy and political considerations that often reflect powerful opposition to
regulation and distribution.77 More specifically, scholars have observed these
political economy dysfunctions in each of the three areas of market
improvement laws. Consumers have had limited success in bringing about
favorable price transparency and licensing laws because they are so dispersed,78
whereas concentrated industry lobbyists exert great influence on legislatures.79
And a consensus has emerged that the antitrust framework has fallen far short.80
Stated otherwise, the skeptics have inadequately considered how institutional
dysfunctions make it unlikely that the law has done everything it can to prevent
widespread market failures that cause high prices.
Ultimately, each of the theoretical points made in this Part hinges on an
empirical claim about whether most of what can be done to address market
failures has already been done. Thus, to have a full sense of the potential for
market improvement laws to meaningfully reduce inflation, the next Part turns
to the empirical evidence.
II. THE EVIDENCE: MARKET IMPROVEMENT LAWS CAN LOWER INFLATION
Part I showed that, in theory, inflation can be addressed by improving
consumer markets, rather than by holding them back. That theory rests on two
key empirical assumptions: (1) market failures significantly raise consumer
prices, and (2) legal reforms can address those market failures. This Part
summarizes the evidence relevant to both assumptions, divided into the three
areas of market improvement laws: price transparency, licensing, and antitrust.
Before turning to that discussion, a caveat is in order. A well-known
limitation of macroeconomics is the ability to predict magnitude, as
demonstrated by the difficulty in estimating what the effects of any given interest

choice theory as applying economic theory to politics).
77 See, e.g., Lee Ann Fennel & Richard H. McAdams, The Distributive Deficit in Law and
Economics, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1051, 1052-53 (2016) (showing how law and economics operates
under a questionable assumption that the desired distribution will subsequently occur but
legislative shortcomings mean that such distribution may never result); MARTIN GILENS,
AFFLUENCE & INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA 81
(2012) (“[W]hen preferences between the well-off and the poor diverge, government policy
bears absolutely no relationship to the degree of support or opposition among the poor.”).
78 See Jean Braucher, Foreword: Consumer Protection and the Uniform Commercial Code, 75 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1, 3 (1997) (describing obstacles to consumer participation).
79 See Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed Occupations Face
Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1108, 1140 (2014) (exploring the role of lobbying in
occupational licensing).
80 See Jonathan B. Baker, Finding Common Ground Among Antitrust Reformers 4-5 (July 9, 2022)
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4141668
(summarizing reform proposals). Of course, antitrust scholars do not agree on the nature and
extent of the legal framework’s shortcomings. See id.
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rate hike will have on inflation.81 Microeconomics offers greater precision by
studying a particular market, but a similar magnitude challenge plagues the study
of aggregate market failures across the economy, in part because information
about costs, prices, and preferences are often unavailable.82 Thus, market
improvement laws face predictive difficulties, but since other anti-inflation tools
face related limits that should not be grounds for dismissing market
improvement laws. It bears emphasis that this Article’s core arguments do not
depend on establishing any particular magnitude of market failure. They instead
depend on concluding that there are price-increasing market failures that the law
can address.
A. Market Failures Significantly Raise Consumer Prices
Despite empirical limits, a growing body of empirical research has begun to
quantify the higher prices paid due to inadequate price transparency,
occupational licensing, and antitrust laws.83 The following summary aims to
provide a sense of the potential magnitudes rather than to establish any
particular level of price increases.
1. Price Transparency Market Failures
Businesses systematically charge consumers higher prices by making it
harder to compare options. The list of tactics that businesses use for this
purpose is too vast to summarize. In one common strategy, known as drip
pricing, businesses shift costs to later phases in the purchase process.84 Airlines
charge fees for baggage, printer manufacturers charge high prices for ink refills,
and Airbnb adds cleaning and convenience fees that significantly increase the
final price beyond what originally appeared in the search results.85 Researchers
have found that these practices weaken consumers’ ability to compare full
prices—even if consumers know that those costs will be added later.86 As
81 Mishkin, supra note 45, at 213; see also Paul Krugman, Opinion, I Was Wrong About Inflation,
N.Y. TIMES, (July 21, 2022), (“Everyone in the debate agreed that deficit spending would
stimulate demand; everyone agreed that a stronger economy with a lower unemployment rate
would, other things equal, have a higher inflation rate. What we had instead was an argument
about magnitudes.”).
82 Asher Schechter, The Rise of Market Power and the Decline of Labor’s Share, PROMARKET
(Aug. 14, 2017), https://promarket.org/rise-market-power-decline-labors-share/ (interviewing
economists Jan De Loecker and Jan Eeckhout about data challenges).
83 For a summary of some of the principal limits, and why they should not block such
studies from being used, see Rory Van Loo, Broadening Consumer Law: Competition, Protection, and
Distribution, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 211 (2019).
84 Gabaix & David LaibsonXavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer
Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q.J. ECON. 505, 506–07 (2006).
85 See id.
86 See id.
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another example, companies offer teaser rates for online subscriptions or credit
cards, knowing that many people will not follow through with unsubscribing or
changing credit cards before the prices increase.87
Behavioral surcharges are not limited to complex purchases. Jon Hanson
and Douglas Kysar have documented how even in seemingly straightforward
retail settings, sellers like Walmart and Target implement countless strategies to
profit systematically from “market manipulation.”88 For instance, stores put
higher-price items where most consumers’ eyes naturally gravitate on the shelves
and misleadingly frame prices as being “discounted” from some original higher
price.89 Building on that work, Ryan Calo demonstrated that the ability to
influence people’s choices has only grown in the era of “digital market
manipulation.”90 Sellers scientifically study details including facial patterns of
people in advertisements, the ordering of items on the screen, and even which
fonts are most likely to encourage purchasing.91 I later argued that such practices,
both across retail and the broader economy, have important macroeconomic
implications for issues such as inequality.92 These strategies, and countless more
like them, may sound trivial, but for the purposes of anti-inflation, it is important
to view them through an empirical lens.
Economists empirically studying the resulting price effects have consistently
found that these strategies cause consumers to pay significantly more. For
instance, excessively complex cell phone plans were associated with 8% higher
consumer prices.93 Hiding mandatory fees on StubHub until later in the
purchase process increased ticket payments by 21%.94 Even in straightforward
online settings, where price comparisons are a click away, obscuring product
descriptions and shipping costs is associated with price increases of 6% to 9%.95
87 See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Ryan Bubb, Credit Card Pricing: The Card Act and Beyond, 97
CORNELL L. REV. 967, 1001 (2012) (“[R]egulators should . . . consider limiting the ability of
issuers to charge introductory teaser interest rates that are, in a sense, ‘too low’”); Shelle Santana,
Steven K. Dallas & Vicki G. Morwitz, Consumer Reactions to Drip Pricing, 39 MKTG. SCI. 188, 188
(2020) (summarizing widespread drip pricing practices).
88 Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market
Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420 (1999).
89 Id.
90 Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995 (2014).
91 Id.
92 See Rory Van Loo, Helping Buyers Beware: The Need for Supervision of Big Retail, 163 U. PA. L.
REV. 1311, 1387 (2015); ASDF .
93 Oren Bar-Gill & Rebecca Stone, Pricing Misperceptions: Explaining Pricing Structure in the Cell
Phone Service Market, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 430, 432, 453–54 (2012). The reference point
for the comparison was the plan at the same cell phone carrier that would have saved the most
money. Id.
94 Tom Blake, Sarah Moshary, Kane Sweeney & Steve Tadelis, Price Salience and Product Choice,
40 MKTG. SCI. 619, 619 (2021). Unlike with the cell phone plans, this research reflects strategies
that pushed consumers toward a different product (a different seat) that was more expensive.
Id.
95 Glenn Ellison & Sara Fisher Ellison, Search, Obfuscation, and Price Elasticities on the Internet,
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In short, the empirical evidence has established that a lack of pricing
transparency significantly increases prices by exploiting informational and
behavioral market failures—even for products of identical quality.96 Moreover,
many of these studies only look at one pricing strategy. Therefore, the full effects
of multiple practices could produce even higher magnitudes of increased
prices.97 Inflation policies designed in an era before these practices became
widespread do not reflect a comprehensive understanding of consumer prices
today.98
2. Licensing Law Market Failures
Legislatures regularly enact laws that insulate existing market participants
from competition and consequently produce higher prices in consumer
transactions. For example, tariffs increase the prices of foreign sellers, thereby
enabling domestic sellers to charge higher prices.99 Less widely recognized is the
fact that state license laws protect about 30% of occupations.100 These laws
require massage therapists, hair braiders, fortune tellers, and many others to
satisfy various conditions to work. They typically mandate that the aspiring
worker complete a year of expensive training, pay hundreds of dollars for a
license, and pass a licensure exam that also comes with a fee.101 Some licensing
provides valuable quality control, but the restrictions often go beyond what is
needed for consumer protection—such as Louisiana and Tennessee statutes
requiring that caskets only be sold by licensed sellers.102 Research indicates, for
77 ECONOMETRICA 427, 428–29 (2009).
96 For reviews of this literature, see Michael D. Grubb, Failing to Choose the Best Price: Theory,
Evidence, and Policy, 47 REV. INDUS. ORG. 303, 310-13 (2015); OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY
CONTRACT 26 (2012); Rory Van Loo, Broadening Consumer Law: Competition, Protection, and
Distribution, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 211, 219-31 (2019).
97 For instance, the study by Bar-Gill and Stone finding 8% increases in price looked only
at consumers’ mistakes in choosing among the plans offered by a single carrier. See Bar-Gill &
Stone, supra note 93, at 453. Consequently, if the plan purchased was compared to the best deal
available across all carriers, and factors beyond complexity were considered, the price increase
could be significantly higher.
98 On the growth of such practices, see BAR-GILL, supra note 96, at 2-10; Ellison & Ellison,
supra note 95, at 428.
99 On the possibility of reducing tariffs in response to inflation, see Matthew Yglesias,
Opinion, Biden Can Do Much More to Fight Inflation, BLOOMBERG (May 16, 2022, 4:45 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-05-15/biden-can-do-much-more-tofight-inflation.
100 See Morris M. Kleiner & Evgeny Vorotnikov, Analyzing Occupational Licensing Among the
States, 52 J. REG. ECON. 132, 134 (2017).
101 See Dick M. Carpenter III et al., The Continuing Burden of Occupational Licensing in the United
States,
38
ECON.
AFFS.
380
(2018),
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecaf.12319 (studying licensing laws across all
50 states).
102 See St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F. 3d 215, 225 (5th Cir. 2013) (finding no rational
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instance, that some licensing restrictions raise dental service prices by over 10%
without improving oral health.103 Evidence also suggests that legal reforms
giving nurse practitioners greater licensing independence reduced prices by as
much as 16% without diminishing the “quality and safety of health services.”104
Economists’ rough estimate of the aggregate impact of licensing restrictions is
that they raise consumer prices by about 15% across much of the service
economy.105
Related laws also reach goods. Laws in all fifty states limit the number of
franchises that can sell any manufacturer’s car in a given territory, thereby
providing auto dealers with local monopolies, preventing online sales of new
vehicles, and making in-person price comparisons difficult.106 A Department of
Justice study, relying on estimates by Goldman Sachs, concluded these statutes
raise prices by 8.6%.107
A final related category is zoning laws, which often make obtaining a
government building permit far more onerous. For example, economists have
found that such zoning regulations cause an estimated “regulatory tax” on
single-family homes of over 50% of the total home value in the San Francisco
Bay Area and over 20% in Boston.108 The price impact varies greatly by location,
and not all areas have zoning laws. However, because housing has a strong
impact on inflation, even a few percentage points would prove particularly

basis for concluding that the statute helped safety, health, or consumer protection); Craigmiles
v. Giles, 312 F. 3d 220, 228-29 (6th. Cir. 2002) (finding that the statute whose true goal was “to
privilege certain businessmen over others . . . cannot survive rational basis”).
103 See Morris M. Kleiner & Robert T. Kudrle, Does Regulation Affect Economic Outcomes? The
Case of Dentistry, 43 J.L. & ECON. 547, 573 (2000) (“[A] state that changed from a low or medium
to highest restrictiveness could expect to see an increase in the price of dental services of about
11 percent.”); Coady Wing & Allison Marier, Effects of Occupational Regulations on the Cost of Dental
Services: Evidence from Dental Insurance Claims, 34 J. HEALTH ECON. 131, 132 (2014) (finding that
limiting the authority of hygienists increases the prices of basic dental services by about 12%).
104 Kleiner et al., Relaxing Occupational Licensing Requirements: Analyzing Wages and Prices for a
Medical Service, 59 J.L. & ECON. 261, 261 (2016).
105 See MORRIS M. KLEINER, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: PROTECTING THE PUBLIC
INTEREST OR PROTECTIONISM?, UPJOHN INST. EMP’T RESEARCH 2011, at 2–3 (Policy Paper
No.
2011-009),
http://research.upjohn.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=up_policypapers
[http://perma.cc/PW8E-7HG5].
106 See, e.g., Daniel Crane, Tesla and the Car Dealers’ Lobby, 24 REGULATION 10, 12–14 (2014);
Francine Lafontaine & Fiona Scott Morton, Markets: State Franchise Laws, Dealer Terminations, and
the Auto Crisis, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 233, 240 (2010).
107 See GERALD R. BODISCH, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIVISION, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS GROUP, ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF STATE BANS ON DIRECT MANUFACTURER SALES
TO
CAR
BUYERS
4
(2009),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2009/05/28/246374.pdf (estimating
automobile price increases due to territorial monopolies at 8.6%).
108 See Joseph Gyourko & Raven Molloy, Regulation and Housing Supply, HANDBOOK OF
REGIONAL AND URBAN ECON. Vol. 5B 1289, 1295–96 (2015).
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meaningful for inflation.109
3. Antitrust Market Failures
The empirical study of antitrust is, in many ways, less reliable than research
in other areas of market improvement laws. Nonetheless, it provides reason to
believe that antitrust could play a meaningful role in lowering prices. Economists
have linked many mergers and high levels of industry concentration with lower
consumer welfare and higher prices.110 In one of the most prominent studies,
John Kwoka looked at 50 mergers and found that most of them increased prices,
typically by about 10%.111
Whereas Kwoka’s examination covered numerous industries, others have
focused on particular industries. For instance, since the mid-1990s alone, over
1,000 hospital mergers have occurred.112 A large body of research demonstrates
that hospital mergers have overall led to higher prices, but not necessarily
improvements in health care quality.113 The most comprehensive of these
studies, a longitudinal analysis of 97 mergers between 1989 and 1996, found that
hospital mergers led to price increases of 40%.114 Studies have found price

109 Cf. Fernando Alvarez, Andrew Atkinson & Chris Edmond, Sluggish Responses of Prices and
Inflation to Monetary Shocks in an Inventory Model of Money Demand, 124 Q. J. ECON. 911, 947-49
(2009) (outlining the relationship between housing prices and inflation); See Devin Bunten, Is the
Rent Too High? Aggregate Implications of Local Land-Use Regulation 25 (Fed. Reserve Bd. Working
Paper
No.
2017-64),
available
at
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2017064pap.pdf (finding that housing
prices could overall be lowered several percentage points through more optimal zoning laws).
110 See Orley Ashenfelter et. al., Did Robert Bork Understate the Competitive Impact of Mergers?
Evidence from Consummated Mergers, 57 J.L. & ECON. S67, S79 (2014) (overall, the results from the
retrospective literature on mergers show that mergers in oligopolistic markets can result in
economically meaningful price increases); see also Louis Kaplow & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust, in
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1073, 1112 (A.M. Polinksky & S. Shavell Eds. 2007)
(“Collusive outcomes are less likely to occur in industries with more firms . . . .”).
111 JOHN KWOKA, MERGERS, MERGER CONTROL, AND REMEDIES: A RETROSPECTIVE
ANALYSIS OF U.S. POLICY 39-46 (2015). One limit is that the mergers chosen to be studied were
more likely to have been suspected of being problematic beforehand. Consequently, this result
is more indicative of the existence of many mergers that increase prices, rather than of the
percentage of mergers that do so.
112 See Eduardo Porter, Health Care’s Overlooked Cost Factor, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/12/business/examinations-of-health-costs-overlookmergers.html.
113 See, e.g., Barak D. Richman, Antitrust and Nonprofit Hospital Mergers: A Return to Basics, 156
U. PA. L. REV. 121, 125 (2007) (“Recent studies suggest that market power pervades the health
care sector and is responsible for a torrent of supracompetitive—and even supramonopoly—
prices.”); Ashenfelter et al., supra note 110, at S84–S85 tbl.3 (summarizing post-merger hospital
studies with findings ranging from no price increase to increases of 50%, 65%, and 80%).
114 See Leemore Dafny, Estimation and Identification of Merger Effects: An Application to Hospital
Mergers, 52 J.L. & ECON. 523, 528, 530, 544 (2009).
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increases following mergers in other areas as well, including banking,115
insurance,116 and food and beverage.117
Despite this evidence, estimating prices at specific points in time before and
after individual mergers faces methodological limitations because other factors
may contribute to the measured price differences.118 It is also difficult to know
what to make of the literature finding that, over the past several decades, most
industries have become more concentrated and dominated by an ever-shrinking
number of competitors.119 The presence of large businesses in a concentrated
industry with high markups cannot, by itself, establish that the high markups are
caused by the concentration of the industry.120 Increased productivity and
quality—such Apple’s advancements in smart phone quality—can contribute to
higher markups in concentrated industries.121 And some mergers and industry
consolidation have surely lowered prices.122 Thus, the evidence about how
industry consolidation has affected consumers is mixed, but suggests that in at
least some industries there are opportunities to promote more competitive
prices by improving antitrust enforcement related to mergers and industry
structure.
Another potential source of antitrust-related price inflation comes not from
mergers or industry concentration, but from price coordination among firms.
One prominent example is the pharmaceutical industry. After their patents
115 See, e.g., Robert M. Adams et al., Market Power in Outputs and Inputs: an Empirical Application
to Banking, 16, 24 tbl.1 (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Fin. & Econ. Discussion
Series Working Paper No. 2002-52, 2002) (finding anticompetitive markups of 10 basis points
for real estate loans and 18 basis point for installment loans).
116 See, e.g., Leemore Dafny, Mark Duggan & Subramaniam Ramanarayanan, Paying a
Premium on Your Premium? Consolidation in the US Health Insurance Industry, 102 AM. ECON. REV.
1161, 1163 (2012) (finding that health insurer consolidation may have caused a 7% increase in
premiums).
117 Orley Ashenfelter et. al., supra note 110, at S79 (finding anticompetitive price increases
of 3% for cereal, 1% to 7% for liquor, 4% to 13% for soft drinks, 9% for milk).
118 For example, for mergers economists often use a difference-in-differences methodology
to compare prices in control group markets unaffected by the merger to prices—before and
after—in markets affected by the merger to determine whether margins have increased
anticompetitively, rather than relying on businesses’ actual cost and price data. See John Simpson
& David Schmidt, Difference-in-Differences Analysis in Antitrust: A Cautionary Note, 75 ANTITRUST
L.J. 623, 624 (2008) (discussing assumptions underlying difference-in-differences estimations).
This requires locating a similar control group, such as a different geography or stores’ own
brands, presumed to be unaffected by the merger. See id.
119 Among other reasons, the mechanism for the overcharge cannot necessarily be identified
from any given study—it might be actual collusion, a rational avoidance of price wars, or
algorithmically driven. Nor is a problematic level of concentration necessarily the result of
anticompetitive conduct or mergers. For a review of this literature, see Steven Berry, Martin
Gaynor & Fiona Scott Morton, Do Increasing Markups Matter? Lessons from Empirical Industrial
Organization, J. ECON PERSPS. 44, 60 (2019).
120 See Berry et al., supra note 119, at 46-47.
121 See, e.g., Sam Peltzman, Productivity, Prices, and Concentration in Manufacturing: A Demsetzian
Perspective, 65 J.L. & ECON. S121, S136, S151 (2022).
122 See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter et. al., supra note 110, at S90 tbl.5, S92 tbl.5.
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expire, drug companies such as Pfizer, Merck, and Johnson & Johnson often
pay other companies to refrain from offering competing drugs. One estimate
put the resulting annual price increase at a 5% increase in the costs of
pharmaceuticals.123
Usually, however, price coordination occurs in a more hidden manner. Legal
scholars have argued that unprosecuted price-fixing is widespread.124 According
to various studies, price-fixing has raised prices to U.S. consumers by 18% to
37% in markets ranging from baby food to cosmetics.125 The total cost to
consumers globally is estimated to reach over half a trillion dollars.126
Price-fixing may be far more of a problem in today’s economy because
prices are increasingly set using algorithms. Businesses’ programmers typically
instruct algorithms to find the profit-maximizing price, meaning that the
“invisible hand” has become the “digitized hand.”127 Intelligently maximizing
profits inevitably amounts to finding ways to set prices above competitive
level.128 Moreover, the potential magnitude of resulting price increases can be
large, with one study showing gas prices increased by 9% to 28% after gas station
owners switched from traditional to algorithmic pricing.129 It is thus plausible, if
C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and Rulemaking to
Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 661 (2009) (“The size of the buyer overcharge
from pay-for-delay settlements likely exceeds $16 billion.”); Jeanne Whalen, Outlook is Cut for
U.S. Drug Sales, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 2008, at B5 (putting drug sales at about $297 billion in
2008).
124 See, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, How to Hide a Price-Fixing Conspiracy: Denial, Deception, and
Destruction of Evidence, 2021 U. ILL L. REV. 1199, 1203-04, 1248 (2021) (“Price-fixing conspiracies
overcharge consumers by billions of dollars every year.”); D. Daniel Sokol, Policing the Firm, 89
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 785, 791 (2013) (summarizing the literature on price-fixing and
concluding that the resulting overcharge is high).
125 See John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, The Size of Cartel Overcharges: Implications for U.S.
and EU Fining Policies, 51 ANTITRUST BULL. 983, 983 (2006).
126 JOHN M. CONNOR, GLOBAL PRICE FIXING 1, 46-47 (2d ed. 2008) (estimating pricefixing impact on prices globally based on samples); see also Ludovic Panon & Flavien Moreau,
Macroeconomic Effects of Market Structure Distortions 1, (April 25, 2022) (unpublished
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=4106663 (estimating that breaking down French
cartels would increase welfare by 3.5%).
127 See, e.g., ARIEL EZRACHI & MAURICE E. STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION: THE
PROMISE AND PERILS OF THE ALGORITHM-DRIVEN ECONOMY 27 (2016) (showing how
algorithms increasingly set prices); STEPHANIE ASSAD, EMILIO CALVANO, GIACOMO CALZORI,
ROBERT CLARK, VINCENZO DENICOLÒ, DANIEL ERSHOV, JUSTIN JOHNSON, SERGIO
PASTORELLO, ANDREW RHODES, LEI XU, MATTHIJS WILDENBEEST, Autonomous Algorithmic
Collusion: Economic Research and Policy Implications, 37 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 459 (2021)
(explaining that a whole industry has arisen of third parties promising businesses help with
pricing optimization).
128 For sophisticated modeling demonstrating this proposition, see Emilio Calvano,
Giacomo Calzolari, Vincenzo Denicolò, & Sergio Pastorello, Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic
Pricing, and Collusion, 110 AM. ECON. REV. 3267 (2020); and Assad et al., supra note 127, at 460.
129 See Assad et al., supra note 127, at 463-64. The researchers inferred the timing of
adoption of algorithmic pricing, which creates some limitations for these findings. Id. at 5.
123
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not expected, that algorithms expand what was already believed to be a high
level of undetected price-fixing throughout the economy.130
In sum, it would be difficult to estimate the precise total level of market
failures causing higher prices across the economy. However, one would need to
ignore the empirical evidence, or place unwarranted faith in markets, to not
recognize that there are widespread market failures. The harder task is predicting
what the law can do about these market failures.
B. Market Improvement Laws Can Work
A causal relationship between market failures and high prices implies, but
does not necessarily prove, that the law can address those high prices. Given
limited governmental resources and reluctance to intervene in markets, it is
important to consider the evidence about whether market improvement laws
might work.
1. Price Transparency Laws
Many consumer laws have the effect of lowering prices. Yet the absence of
scholarship considering consumer laws as a response to inflation suggests that
this basic function of consumer laws is not broadly understood. One
explanation for that inattention is that price is a central concept in antitrust
analyses, but consumer laws focus on a company’s behavior being unfair or
deceptive without needing to offer evidence of a price effect.131
Part of the disconnect may also be that the few consumer laws that explicitly
target prices only apply in narrow circumstances. Most notably, price gouging
laws prohibit sellers from exploiting crises to charge considerably more. For
example, sellers risk prosecution if they dramatically increase the price of masks
upon the start of a pandemic.132 Another visible area of consumer pricing laws
prohibits “unconscionably” high pricing practices in areas such as
pharmaceuticals and mortgages, which have been described as practices
significantly varying from industry standards.133 Neither price gouging nor
unconscionability doctrines are helpful in broadly addressing inflation. They are
130 Although Ezrachi and Stucke stated this most clearly in the context of competition, and
others have added evidence to this effect. See EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 127, at 32-33; Salil
K. Mehra, Antitrust and the Robo-Seller: Competition in the Time of Algorithms, 100 MINN. L. REV.
1323, 1325-27 (2016); Assad et al., supra note 127, at 461.
131 See, e.g., KATHERINE PORTER, MODERN CONSUMER LAW 1-3 (1st ed. 2016)
(summarizing some of the confusion surrounding consumer law’s identity).
132 See Michelle M. Mello & Rebecca E. Wolitz, Legal Strategies for Reining in “Unconscionable”
Prices for Prescription Drugs, 1143 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 897 (2020).
133 See id. at 934, 955 (summarizing laws related to unconscionable pricing); 940 C.M.R. §
8.06(6) (prohibiting mortgage lenders from offering terms that “significantly deviate from
industry-wide standards or which are otherwise unconscionable.”
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designed to address unusual instances of extreme price hikes, not routine and
systemic price increases of a few percentage points.134
Instead, an area of consumer law offers more promise in addressing inflation
despite the reality that is less commonly understood to be about prices. What
this Article refers to as price transparency laws is more commonly known as
disclosures or nudges and seeks to contain the everyday pricing practices that
companies deploy.
In several field experiments, simply providing consumers with helpful
information lowered the prices those consumers paid. In one experiment,
researchers found that sending Medicare recipients a letter advising which of the
available plans would be best saved recipients 5% in out-of-pocket expenses.135
In another, disclosures at the point of sale for payday loans lowered borrowing
costs by 11%.136
Other studies have looked at the impact of new laws or policies on prices.
For instance, consumers paid 20% less for gas following a law that required
electronic billboards on the highways to show all nearby gas stations’ prices.137
Additionally, as mentioned above, an Israeli statute that required stores to make
their prices and product information available in machine-readable formats was
associated with a reduction in price of 4% to 5%.138
Other studies have looked at interventions that sought to help consumers
better calculate prices. For example, many states have mandated that grocery
stores provide unit pricing labels on the shelf to facilitate price comparisons.139
These rules require stores to list per unit prices alongside the full purchase price,
like the price per ounce of peanut butter or per battery. This allows shoppers to
compare offerings of differing sizes and determine which items are cheapest
without needing a calculator.140 Studies suggest that consumers use these labels
to save money in their purchase choices. Even a basic application of unit pricing

134 Additionally, price-gouging laws are seen as potentially inefficient, contributing to
shortages by eroding market forces. See id. at 882.
135 Jeffrey R. Kling et al., Comparison Friction: Experimental Evidence from Medicare Drug Plans,
127 Q.J. ECON. 199, 201, 215 (2012).
136 Marianne Bertrand & Adair Morse, Information Disclosure, Cognitive Biases, and Payday
Borrowing, 66 J. FIN. 1865, 1865 (2011) (reducing payday borrowing by 11% through disclosures
in a field experiment).
137 Federico Rossi & Pradeep K. Chintagunta, Price Transparency and Retail Prices: Evidence from
Fuel Price Signs in the Italian Highway System, 53 J. MARKETING RES. 407, 409 (2016); see also
Ambarish Chandra & Mariano Tappata, Consumer Search and Dynamic Price Dispersion: An
Application to Gasoline Markets, 42 RAND J. ECON. 681, 700 (2011) (estimating gasoline savings of
5% gained by better searching solely in a one-mile radius).
138 Ater & Rigbi, supra note 31.
139 A Guide to U.S. Retail Pricing Laws and Regulations, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH. (Aug.
25, 2016), https://www.nist.gov/pml/weights-and-measures/laws-and-regulations/retail-andunit-pricing-laws.
140 Id.
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led to 1% savings.141 When combined with other tools for comparison, such as
an education campaign, information on unit price disclosures led to 10% to 13%
savings.142
Another category aimed at improving the analysis of information focuses on
the algorithms that increasingly direct people to their ultimate purchase. In one
study with unusual access to internal company data, economists found that a
subtle change to eBay’s algorithm saved consumers 5% to 15% by returning
lower-priced search results first.143 Yet search results are almost entirely
unregulated, and companies have an incentive to increase the prices that
consumers pay.144 It follows that laws pushing online marketplaces toward more
helpful search results could bring consumers considerable savings.
This discussion should not be read to imply that consumer price laws are
straightforward. Disclosures take careful design, and measurement of results, to
avoid waste or even counterproductive effects.145 These complications are
described in greater depth below. Note, however, that the importance of design
underscores how many of the above interventions could be improved, providing
even greater price reductions. For instance, the 5% Medicare savings resulted
from text inserted into a letter that many people presumably did not read. The
researchers observed that had all Medicare patients followed the advice, the
average savings would have been 31%.146 And while the Israeli statute produced
results from mandating machine-readable disclosures, more active support for
helpful digital intermediaries that would analyze all available prices for the
consumer could create more powerful shopping tools, putting even greater price
pressure on sellers.147 Thus, the empirical evidence suggests that price
141

J. Edward Russo, The Value of Unit Price Information, 14 J. MKTG. RSCH. 193, 193-201

(1977).
142 Clinton S. Weeks, Gary Mortimer & Lionel Page, Understanding How Consumer Education
Impacts Shoppers Over Time: A Longitudinal Field Study of Unit Price Usage, 32 J. RETAILING &
CONSUMER SERVS. 198, 206 (2016) (using a field experiment to quantify the savings from
educating consumers about unit prices); see also AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION & CONSUMER
COMM’N, REPORT OF THE ACCC INQUIRY INTO THE COMPETITIVENESS OF RETAIL PRICES
FOR STANDARD GROCERIES 449 (2008) (estimating a 1% savings across all consumers by
improving existing unit pricing laws); James Binkley, Prices Paid in Grocery Markets: Searching Across
Stores and Brands, 47 J. CONSUMER AFF. 465, 466 (2013) (finding that improved price comparison
approaches within stores led to 10% savings).
143 Michael Dinerstein et al., Consumer Price Search and Platform Design in Internet Commerce, 108
AM. ECON. REV. 1820, 1821 (2018).
144 More specifically, they have an interest in maximizing what people pay up to the point
that those prices do not drive people to shop elsewhere. See Frank Pasquale, Internet
Nondiscrimination Principles: Commercial Ethics for Carriers and Search Engines, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
263, 267 (2008)
145 Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L.
REV. 647, 647, 651-65 (2011) (summarizing many failed attempts).
146 Jason Abaluck & Jonathan Gruber, Choice Inconsistencies Among the Elderly: Evidence from
Plan Choice in the Medicare Part D Program, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 1180, 1189-92 (2011).
147 For an exploration of such a proposal, see Rory Van Loo, Helping Buyers Beware: The Need
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transparency laws can significantly lower prices in a variety of markets.
2. Removing Licensing Restrictions Can Lower Prices
Unlike price transparency and antitrust laws, addressing higher prices that
result from governmental licensing requirements has a more straightforward
legal solution: removal of the laws that require those licenses. The above studies
estimating price increases suggest that the removal of excess occupational
licensing laws, territorial restrictions for car dealerships, and zoning laws would
significantly lower prices.148 Indeed, some of that research goes beyond just
estimating price increases resulting from licensing by also modeling the effects
of removing such laws.149
More direct evidence also comes from studies of licensing laws that have
already been improved. For instance, in jurisdictions that expanded the role of
nurse practitioners and allowed them to provide medical services previously only
administered by doctors (albeit still supervised in a doctor’s office), prices
lowered an estimated 3% to 16%.150 As another example, in 1983, Colorado
lawmakers removed licensing requirements mandating that anyone offering
funeral services must have graduated from a mortuary college, trained for a year,
and passed oral and written license examinations.151 A comparison of the
resulting prices in Colorado before and after that licensing removal found that
the reforms lowered prices in Colorado by 15%.152 This direct evidence indicates
that improvements to widespread licensing laws would lower prices
substantially.153
3. Antitrust Reforms Can Lower Prices
Although the above empirical evidence suggests that effective antitrust
would lower prices, that does not mean we can be confident that antitrust
for Supervision of Big Retail, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1311, 1387 (2015).
148 See supra Part I.
149 For instance, one study found that prices would decrease by 4.5% in a range of services
if Arkansas lowered its occupational licensing restrictions to match those of neighboring
Mississippi. THOMAS J. SNYDER, ARKANSAS CENTER FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS, THE
EFFECTS OF ARKANSAS’ OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE REGULATIONS 3 (2016),
https://uca.edu/acre/files/2016/06/The-Effects-of-Arkansas-Occupational-LicensureRegulations-by-Dr.-Thomas-Snyder.pdf
150 Kleiner et. al., supra note 104, at 286.
151 Brandon Pizzola & Alexander Tabarrok, Occupational Licensing Causes a Wage Premium:
Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Colorado’s Funeral Services Industry, 50 INT’L REV. L. & ECON.
50, 52 (2017).
152 See Pizzola & Tabarrok, supra note 151, at 53. Prices differences in Colorado were
compared to price changes over the same time period in other states that did not have such a
removal. Id.
153 For a summary of this empirical literature, see supra Part II.A.
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reforms would product such results. It would be ideal to have evidence of
antitrust reform impacts. Unfortunately, there is limited evidence that speaks
directly to the question of how antitrust reforms would work in the U.S.
economy. A big part of the challenge is simply methodological. Changes to price
transparency and licensing laws are more readily studied because they occur
more frequently and offer researchers the ability to compare prices before and
after a statutory legal reform.154 In contrast, new market-wide antitrust laws have
been enacted less frequently and new policies are typically implemented through
ex post law enforcement processes against individual firms. It is difficult to
measure the market-wide deterrence effects of individual antitrust enforcement
actions.155 Consequently, there are simply fewer rigorous studies of antitrust
law’s ability to lower prices.
Although it is debatable what level of confidence can be had based on the
existing evidence, a patchwork of studies speak to this fundamental question of
antitrust effectiveness. Studies from decades ago found that in the months and
years after the filing of a successful price-fixing antitrust complaint, antitrust
actions for price-fixing or collusion lowered prices by several percentage
points.156 If scholars are correct that most cartels go undetected,157 these
empirical studies suggest that finding a way to prosecute those cartels
successfully would lower prices.158 Of course, this raises the question of whether
such legal authority exists or could be enacted—a topic returned to below in the
discussion of administrability. But for now the point is simply that there is
empirical support for tentatively concluding that a stronger regime for
addressing price fixing could yield help with inflation.
Antitrust enforcers’ ability to address industry concentration is less clear.
Part of the problem is simply that the most powerful remedy—breaking up
companies—is seldom applied in the U.S.159 Moreover, empirical studies of
existing U.S. antitrust interventions tend not to quantify the price effects,
See Kleiner et al., supra note 104, at 286; Pizzola & Tabarrok, supra note 151, at 53.
Gregory J. Werden, Assessing the Effects of Antitrust Enforcement in the United States, 156 DE
ECONOMIST 433 (2008).
156 GEORGE STIGLER & JAMES K. KINDAHL, THE BEHAVIOR OF INDUSTRIAL PRICES 92
(1970) (finding that commodities prices lowered between .7 and 2.4 percent three months after
the complaint and from 2.2 to 4.4 percent in the nine months after the complaint). But see
Michael F. Sproul, Antitrust and Prices, 101 J. POL. ECON. 741 (1993) (“In a survey of 25 cases
filed between 1973 and 1984, prices are found to gradually rise by about 7 percent over the 4
years following an indictment.”).
157 Peter G. Bryant & E. Woodrow Eckard, Price Fixing: The Probability of Getting Caught, 73
REV. ECON. & STAT. 531, 535 (1991) (finding that only 13% to 17% of cartels are detected).
158 However, designing such a regime is complicated. See Leslie, supra note 124, at 1265
(proposing changes to the antitrust regime to allow for greater prosecution of price fixing);
Sokol, supra note 124, at 848 (proposing stronger price-fixing enforcement through the use of
corporate monitors); infra Part III.
159 See KWOKA, supra note 111, at 126-32. For a critique of the analytic approach to
divestitures in the U.S., see Van Loo, supra note 30, at 1955.
154
155
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presumably due to methodological differences.160
The most helpful study comes from the Netherlands, where a new law
forced some owners to divest gas stations chosen at random.161 It found that
when concentrated gas stations were broken up, prices decreased by 1.3 to
2.3%.162 Those findings come with the caveat that they do not reflect a largescale organizational breakup. Instead, the study measured the effects of the
forced sale of existing gas stations whose day-to-day operations presumably
could remain uninterrupted.163 Although these findings are limited in terms of
magnitude and market applicability, they provide some cautious support for the
possibility of using divestitures in at least some contexts to lower prices.
Finally, a newer wave of research has begun to look at the strength of the
overall competition policy of a country in order to determine the effects of those
policies on markets.164 This metric assesses antitrust regimes in terms of factors
such as the ability to impose significant penalties for violations, the level of
investigative authority, and the intensity of oversight applied by enforcers.165
Although this metric has limits, a recent cross-country study found that when
countries adopt stronger competition policies, prices decrease.166
Finally, the above studies finding that some mergers have led to price
increases point to a straightforward policy solution. If the antitrust regime could
be better calibrated to block mergers that would anticompetitively increase
prices, those reforms could over time prevent price increases that would
otherwise happen.167
Thus, although antitrust overall lacks the same direct evidence of success as
price transparency and licensing reforms, there is at least some limited empirical
support for concluding that antitrust interventions reduce prices. Some of the
most promising new policies to significantly lower prices would be those that
might address undetected price-fixing and algorithmic collusion. The variability
of policy options not only within antitrust but also among all market
improvement laws speaks to the importance of a framework for deciding among
anti-inflation policy options.
BUREAU OF COMPETITION & BUREAU OF ECON., FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE FTC’S
MERGER REMEDIES 2006-2012 (2017).
161 Adriaan R. Soetevent, Marco A. Haan & Pim Heijnen, Do Auctions and Forced Divestitures
Increase Competition? Evidence for Retail Gasoline Markets, 62 J. INDUS. ECON. 467, 467-70 (2014).
162 Id. at 469.
163 See id.
164 See Amit Zac, Carola Casti, Christopher Decker & Ariel Ezrachi, Competition Policy
and the Decline of the Labour Share 8 (April 17, 2021) (unpublished manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3824115 (summarizing the competition policy index and its usage).
165 Id.
166 See, e.g., Zac et al., supra note 164, at 28-29 (finding price and profits higher in lowcompetition policy index countries).
167 Again, this is relevant to inflation because it means that less interest rate increases would
be needed than would otherwise be the case to reach a target inflation level. See supra Part I.
160
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III. DESIGNING ANTI-INFLATION LAWS
The preceding discussion has shown the theoretical and empirical
foundations for using market improvement laws to address inflation. The
evidence strongly suggests that consumers face difficulties finding the best deals
and that in many markets well-designed market improvement laws can lower the
prices paid at magnitudes that would offset a meaningful amount of inflation.
This Part offers a framework for choosing among anti-inflation policies. The
goal is to comprehensively compare underappreciated microeconomic options,
such as market improvement laws, to those more macroeconomic options that
tend to be the default choice. It then sketches in greater detail what it would
mean to integrate market improvement laws during an inflationary period.
A. A Framework for Choosing Inflation Laws
Even after recognizing that market improvement laws have significant
potential to lower prices, policymakers are faced with the task of deciding how
to prioritize among the various anti-inflation laws. Yet in the rare academic
discussions of how more microeconomic laws may address inflation, there is
usually an absence of any framework for choosing among options.168 The
discussion above has indicated four key criteria that can be used to choose
among policy options: direct magnitude, indirect structural support,
administrability, and side effects. Analytic shifts in applying these criteria would
help to better incorporate microeconomic laws into inflation.
1. Direct magnitude. The direct magnitude refers to the percentage of
reduction in inflation as an immediate consequence of the policy. At first glance,
this is one metric on which market improvement laws come up short compared
to macroeconomic tools such as interest rate hikes. In theory, the Federal
Reserve could raise interest rates from its current level of roughly 2% to
something dramatically higher, like 40%, to tame high levels of inflation.169
Similarly, in a command-and-control economy, price controls can dictate the
level of inflation and thereby, in theory, reduce fifty points of inflation or
more.170
In contrast, market improvement laws have built-in limits to their impact on
prices because businesses can only lower prices so far before operating at a
See, e.g., Handler, supra note 12 (considering the role of antitrust in inflation without
clarifying a framework for making such a choice); Aneil Kovvali, Countercyclical Corporate
Governance (forthcoming. N.C. L. Rev.), https://ssrn.com/abstract=4043883 (offering a
framework for incorporating inflation and other macroeconomic considerations into corporate
governance but not for choosing among responses to inflation).
169 See Rubin, supra note 28.
170 There are, of course, practical constraints that will be discussed below.
168

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4226318

34

Anti-Inflation Laws

[21-Jul-22

loss.171 Additionally, there is great variability in the magnitude of price decreases
from market improvement laws across industries,172 making it difficult to know
the precise magnitude achievable across the entire economy.
One caveat is in order when comparing magnitude. Any such analysis must
consider practical institutional limits. For instance, interest rates can only be
raised to certain levels before the costs (especially low growth and
unemployment) become too high to push further. Consequently, the various
criteria for anti-inflation laws influence one another. In this case, the criterion
of direct magnitude interacts with negative side effects, which can limit the
practical magnitude of a mechanism.
Nonetheless, putting other criteria aside for now, there is reason to think
that the direct magnitude of market improvement laws has been underestimated.
This underestimation illuminates how an anti-inflation framework should
analyze magnitude. Relevant academic and policy conversations have focused
on antitrust.173 Yet among the three major areas of market improvement laws,
antitrust offers the most limited empirical support for concluding that there is a
possibility of high magnitude.174 Aggregated together, the market improvement
laws discussed herein have a much larger potential total anti-inflation magnitude
than antitrust alone.
The broader point here is that a siloed approach to considering
microeconomic laws has weakened analyses of anti-inflation laws’ direct
magnitude. With respect to market improvement laws, the analysis of antitrust
law’s magnitude without related areas of law has obscured the relevance of
market failures to inflation. For a comprehensive estimate of the direct
magnitude of anti-inflation policies, it will sometimes be necessary to combine
various areas of law that are united by a common economic frame.
Moreover, academics and policymakers may have underappreciated market
improvement laws’ direct magnitude even within some of the three areas of law
discussed herein. Studies of market improvement laws are often scattered
among various markets, such as gasoline, food, and cell phone plans.175 These
individual microeconomic studies do not immediately provide macroeconomic
magnitudes. To conceptualize the magnitude of a specific type of reform, such
as price transparency laws, observers must synthesize various micro-level
empirical studies into a macro-level magnitude.
Thus, narrow analytic blinders must be removed to obtain a more
comprehensive sense of the potential direct magnitude of anti-inflation laws.
The question of magnitude must not only look across areas of law that would
traditionally be considered separate, such as consumer law and antitrust. Those
See supra Part I.
See supra Part II.
173 See supra Part I.
174 See supra Part II.
175 See supra Part II.
171
172
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interdisciplinary areas of law must also be studied across diverse markets,
ranging from groceries to gasoline, to see how market policies are worth being
in the conversation about fighting inflation.
2. Indirect structural support. The direct magnitude analysis discussed above is
not by itself sufficient to understand the full contributions that an anti-inflation
policy has to offer. Some policies, like market improvement laws, have the
potential to provide indirect support to other anti-inflation laws.176 That
complementary role must also be weighed.
As mentioned above, structural solutions to inflation (such as ending
China’s COVID lockdown) may not work unless consumers have the capacity
and motivation to effectively compare prices. Price transparency is thus crucial
for helping to ensure that structural solutions, like repairing the supply chain,
swiftly impact prices paid. This complementary role in addressing inflation
constitutes the second criteria in this Article’s framework, indirect structural
support.
The indirect structural support provided by other anti-inflation tools are less
clear. In theory, antitrust enforcement and licensing reforms should also
indirectly help other interventions because competitive pressures would push
companies to pass on any sudden supply-chain savings to customers. However,
there is some limited evidence that oligopolies may be quicker than firms in
more competitive industries to pass on later cost savings to consumers.177 If that
research is correct, antitrust would provide less indirect structural support for
anti-inflation than price transparency laws. Nor do price controls and interest
rates offer such indirect support that make it more likely direct solutions will
work.
Consequently, the failure to consider the indirect ways that anti-inflation
laws may operate can distort the design of the policy response. In particular, the
failure to consider this criterion biases the choice away from price transparency
laws. Another way of thinking about structural support is as contributing to a
more comprehensive picture of the full magnitude of the policy response.
See supra Part I.C.
Adriaan Ten Kate & Gunnar Niels, To What Extent are Cost Savings Passed on to Consumers?
An Oligopoly Approach, 20 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 323, 324 (2005) (“In oligopoly it turns out to be
exactly the other way round. When competition is strong individual firms are price takers and
do not pass on their firm-specific cost savings to price; when competition is weak individual
firms have more influence on price and tend to pass on their cost savings to a greater extent.”).
It seems counterintuitive at first that oligopolies would be more likely to past on cost savings.
One possible explanation is that oligopolies do not need inflation to charge higher prices,
because their market power in normal times allows them to do already charge closer to the
profit-maximizing price. A monopoly at some point will not want to charge higher prices
because higher prices decrease demand, and at a certain point the higher price brings less profits.
In contrast, firms in less concentrated industries have a harder time raising prices in normal
times and thus may be less interested in giving up those higher prices if they can avoid doing so.
176
177
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3. Administrability. Administrability refers to the feasibility of effectively
implementing the policy. Anti-inflation policies would ideally not only lower
prices, but do so reasonably rapidly and with some degree of confidence. At first
glance, these considerations cast doubt on at least some types of market
improvement laws, since many of those reforms come with the risk of failure—
especially antitrust laws and poorly designed disclosure mandates.178
Additionally, market improvement laws involve decisions by various regulators,
judges, and attorneys general. The dispersed nature of that implementation
creates administrability challenges. And economists studying inflation have
assumed that antitrust reforms take years to affect prices.179 Whether those
perspectives are correct is subject to debate and will be returned to shortly, but
it is necessary to recognize that the general perception has been that market
improvement laws are low on administrability.
In contrast, policy makers are more likely to feel confident that raising
interest rates will lower inflation because this tool has been used repeatedly for
that purpose in the past.180 It is also institutionally straightforward to
implement—requiring a single administrative agency, the Federal Reserve, to
make a single decision. Strictly enforcing price caps can also immediately lower
the prices that consumers pay, although it is more institutionally complicated
because it mostly requires the passage of legislation.181
While these advantages to interest rates and price caps are real, they should
not be exaggerated. The political response to interest rates and price controls
adds unpredictability, as backlash may ensue from their potentially devastating
economic side effects. That backlash may get in the way of interest rate
reductions’ ability to fully address inflation.
The direct magnitude of inflation reduced by interest rate hikes is also
difficult to know in advance due to macroeconomic conditions that differ from
those in previous inflationary periods.182 Additionally, it typically takes a year
178 The extent to which established interventions from one market will work in a different
market is especially uncertain.
179 See, e.g., David Brancaccio & Jarrett Dang, Another Cure for Inflation? Making Markets More
Competitive, MARKETPLACE, Apr. 1, 2022, https://www.marketplace.org/2022/04/01/anothercure-for-inflation-making-markets-more-competitive (quoting professor of economics Trevon
Logan as observing that with competition policies “we’d be talking several years before that
might impact prices.”).
180 See ROBERT L. HETZEL, THE MONETARY POLICY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE: A
HISTORY 204 (Michael D. Bordo, Marc Flandreau, Chris Meissner, François Velde & David C.
Wheelock eds., 2008); Jeffery, Michele Schaff, Expert’s Corner: Municipal Bond Market Improprieties
and the Potential Brutality of Investing in Bonds, 11 PIABA B.J. 56, 62 (2004) (“Alan Greenspan has
repeatedly testified that the Federal Reserve is in the process of raising interest rates in an effort
to stave off inflation.”).
181 See supra Part I.B.
182 There is also some broader controversy about how inflation interacts with interest rates.
See Mishkin, supra note 45, at 213 (“[T]he apparent ability of short-term interest rates to forecast
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before interest rates meaningfully hit inflation, with peak impact occurring at
close to two years.183 Price controls can have a more immediate impact on prices,
but they are extremely difficult to administer beyond the short term, as they
effectiveness uncertain.184
Moreover, differences in administrability are difficult to compare rigorously.
Some market improvement laws have been found to lower prices considerably
in specific markets.185 They can also do so on a relatively short timeline, with
one field experiment finding that consumer education campaigns lowered prices
paid by about 17% to 18% within six weeks.186 In contrast, legislative
interventions often take time to design and then pass, introducing additional
delays. However, many other avenues exist for a more immediate impact on
consumer prices, such as administrative agencies or attorneys general enforcing
current laws more aggressively.187
Antitrust faces more significant administrability challenges than price
transparency laws. Even if it is assumed that industry concentration contributed
to high prices, it is not clear what can be done about that on a short timeframe.
Breaking up large companies would be the most direct response, but breakups
take years and cost billions of dollars to implement.188 As a result, even a
successful breakup could increase prices in the short term, and often requires
years to be effective. Additionally, antitrust enforcers can only prosecute a small
number of cases at any time and must act against individual firms, meaning that
it could take decades to go through all the major industries and bring cases
against individual companies.189 Discouraging cartels and collusion could
inflation in the postwar United States is spurious.”); John H. Cochrane, Do Higher Interest
Rates Raise or Lower Inflation? 66 (Feb. 1, 2016) (unpublished manuscript),
https://bfi.uchicago.edu/wp-content/uploads/fisher.pdf (“A review of the empirical evidence
finds very weak support for the standard theoretical view that raising interest rates lowers
inflation, and much of that evidence is colored by the imposition of strong priors of that sign. I
conclude that a positive reaction of inflation to interest rate changes is a possibility we, and
central bankers, ought to begin to take seriously.”).
183 See, e.g., Tomas Havranek & Marek Rusnak, Transmission Lags of Monetary Policy: A MetaAnalysis, 33 INT’L J. CENT. BANKING 39, 57 tbl. 6. (2012) (finding an average time lag of 23
months for the full decrease in prices to arrive); Fernando Alvarez, Andrew Atkinson & Chris
Edmond, Sluggish Responses of Prices and Inflation to Monetary Shocks in an Inventory Model of Money
Demand, 124 Q. J. ECON. 911, 947-49 (2009) (referencing the delayed impact).
184 FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at 135.
185 See supra Part II.
186 See Weeks et al., supra note 142, at 206 (observing that these peak savings six weeks after
the unit pricing materials were sent and that the savings declined to 11% to 13% by the end of
the study at 20 weeks).
187 See infra Part III.C.
188 Van Loo, supra note 30, at 1986.
189 See Alex Kantrowitz, ‘It’s Ridiculous.’ Underfunded FTC and DOJ Can’t Keep Fighting the Tech
Giants
Like
This,
SUBSTACK:
BIG
TECH.
(Sept.
17,
2020),
https://bigtechnology.substack.com/p/its-ridiculous-underfunded-us-regulators (citing former
FTC director).
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produce faster results, although detecting price-fixing is not without its
challenges.190
Perhaps the most straightforward market improvement laws in terms of
design is the removal of existing licensing laws. However, even those reforms
ideally would be implemented in a thoughtful manner to preserve valuable
consumer protections. And because most licensing laws are at the state or local
level, there is a complicated legislative and judicial path to reforming such laws
in a systematic manner.191 Another potential legal avenue for challenging
governmental licensing regimes is through laws that protect rights, such as the
Equal Protection Clause, since licensing laws often have a discriminatory effect
in terms of who they block from obtaining employment or affordable housing.192
Overall, the criterion of administrability disfavors market improvement laws
as a tool for fighting inflation, to varying degrees depending on the sub-category.
But it is important not to exaggerate the administrability challenges of market
improvement laws compared to interest rates and price caps, which also face
institutional difficulties. It is also important not to give administrability greater
weight than other criteria, like side effects.
4. Side effects. Finally, the policy’s side effects must be considered. This
criterion has traditionally focused only on the economic sacrifices that must be
made to control inflation.193 Consequently, it has had less of an influence than it
For scholars’ proposals to address this limitation, see infra Part III.B.
See Aaron Edlin and Rebecca Haw Allensworth originally argued and the Supreme Court
ultimately confirmed in part. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 79, at 1099, 1100 (proposing
“competitor-dominated boards that regulate their own competition and the entry of competitors
. . . be treated as private actors and subject to antitrust review unless their acts are both (1)
pursuant to the state's clearly articulated purpose to displace competition and (2) subject to
active state supervision”); N. Carolina State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. F.T.C., 574 U.S. 494,
495, 496 (2015) (holding that state licensing boards were not immune from antitrust laws)
(explaining that for a licensing board to be immune from federal antitrust law, its anticompetitive
conduct must be “clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy” and the policy
must be “actively supervised by the state.”); Rebecca Haw Allensworth, Foxes at the Henhouse:
Occupational Licensing Boards Up Close, 105 CAL. L. REV. 1567, 1579 (2017) (“Since the Court’s
decision in North Carolina Dental, issued in February 2015, over a dozen suits have been filed
against state licensing boards alleging Sherman Act violations and arguing that the board is not
subject to state action immunity.”); Daniel A. Crane, Tesla, Dealer Franchise Laws, and the Politics of
Crony Capitalism, 101 IOWA L. REV. 573, 602 (2016) (“Antitrust law . . . is unavailable because of
the Parker state action doctrine, which permits states to enact even nakedly anticompetitive
legislation so long as the anticompetitive policy is clearly and affirmatively expressed as state
policy and actively supervised by the state”).
192 Cf. Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and Occupational Licensing, 39 HARVARD J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 209, 284 (2016) (“[S]ome federal courts have relied on the Equal Protection (or Due
Process) Clause to hold unconstitutional state laws that unreasonably restrict access into certain
professions.”).
193 See, e.g., Robert J. Gordon, The Phillips Curve Now and Then 7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch.,
190
191
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should because the anti-inflation analysis has failed to adjust for the magnitude
of market failure across the economy.194 Instead, the analysis should be
broadened to consider how much of inflation might be addressed in
economically beneficial ways. It is here that market improvement laws offer the
most appeal when compared to alternatives. As discussed above, significant
interest rate hikes raise the risks of a recession and increase unemployment.
Price caps can harm efficiency and discourage innovation.195 In contrast,
transparency laws, the removal of licensing restrictions, and antitrust move the
economy toward greater efficiency, growth, and innovation.196
This is not to say that market improvement laws are without negative side
effects. Price transparency laws impose compliance costs on businesses. The
impact of such costs must always be considered and mitigated as much as
possible. However, all regulations inevitably have costs. Therefore, the existence
of costs alone cannot determine whether a regulation is warranted. Those costs
must be weighed against the benefits. Supplying customers with helpful
information is a standard component of transacting that has long been expected
in markets.197 It is thus consistent with basic market functions to expect actors
to inform the parties with whom they transact. Since inflation is economically
destructive, and given the efficiency gains of consumers making more informed
decisions, the costs of complying with regulations should not defeat a proposal
for effective price transparency laws that would correct significant market
failures.
Beyond the costs of complying with any given legal rule, there is also a risk
of designing the policy intervention in a way that unintentionally harms the
market. In particular, blocking a beneficial merger or breaking up an efficient
company could lead to higher prices. This is where the existing research on what
has worked in the past can help to prioritize and inform anti-inflation laws.198
The removal of licensing has a particular downside that must be considered:
less consumer protection. To mitigate this, the reforms could replace licensing
with optional certification. Consumers could then choose to pay more for the
certified services if they would like, such as for hair salons or funeral services.
Low-income consumers who otherwise might not be able to afford services
Working Paper No. 3393, 1990), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1806849 (discussing the use of a
sacrifice ratio in analyzing inflation policies).
194 Under outdated assumptions that markets are essentially as close to perfection as
possible, every major intervention would be expected to distort markets away from the current
level of near-perfection.194 Overlooking this criterion—or assuming it is only about harms—will
normally disfavor market improvement laws, since they improve the economy whereas high
interest rates risk recession.
195 See supra Part I.A.
196 Supra Part I.
197 See, e.g., N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 66-67 (6th ed. 2012)
(discussing the basic function of information in markets)
198 For some of this evidence, see supra Part II.B.
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would then still have the option of lower price points. Moreover, those lower
priced offerings would put some price pressure on the certified services.199
Additionally, Yelp and other rating websites can mitigate the risk that removing
licensing leads to worse quality because they can provide some reputational
accountability.200 Finally, it is worth noting that in many contexts, the consumer
protection implications of removing licensing will not be significant. For
example, seven years after the state legislature had delicensed funeral services,
the Colorado Department of Regulatory Agencies investigated the impact on
customers and found that the “claims that the public in Colorado had suffered
or might suffer significant detriment due to a lack of trained mortuary science
practitioners . . . were unsupported.”201
The removal of occupational licensing also has a complex mix of
employment results. Removal should normally decrease wages because more
people could enter the occupation, while also increasing the number of jobs,
especially for low-income and immigrant workers who might not be able to
access or afford the expensive training often required to satisfy licensing
requirements.202
In summary, the removal of occupational licensing would improve market
efficiency and expand employment, but could lower some consumer protection
and wages. The price savings to consumers, increase in aggregate wealth, and
job creation make these side effects overall positive. Consequently, the removal
of licensing has much more appealing economic side effects than raising interest
rates, which has overwhelmingly negative side effects.203 But occupational
licensing improvements offer less beneficial side effects than antitrust and price
transparency improvements, which bring overwhelmingly positive side effects.
***
Given that no policy is superior with respect to all four criteria, the task
becomes how to balance the criteria. Two considerations will prove helpful.
First, it is important not to let administrability and direct magnitude alone
outweigh all other criteria. Yet that appears to be the traditional approach to
On mitigating the harmful effects of removing occupational licensing, see Caleb R.
Trotter, Exhuming the Privileges or Immunities Clause to Bury Rational-Basis Review, 60 LOY. L. REV.
909, 958 (2014).
200 Id. On the benefits and drawbacks of reputational mechanisms, see Yonathan Arbel,
Reputation Failure: The Limits of Market Discipline in Consumer Markets, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1239, 1240-46 (2019).
201 DEP’T OF REGUL. AGENCIES, OFF. OF POL’Y, RSCH. AND REGUL. REFORM, 2007
SUNRISE REVIEW, FUNERAL SERVICE PRACTITIONERS 16 (2013).
202 See SNYDER, supra note 149, at 21-22; Hugh Cassidy & Tennecia Dacass, Occupational
Licensing and Immigrants, 64 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 (2021) (finding that language and other obstacles
mean that immigrants are less likely to seek out and obtain occupational licenses).
203 See supra Part I.A.
199
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inflation. To ignore indirect structural support and side effects risks missing
more subtle effects of policies on inflation and the economy.
Second, even if policymakers were to decide that administrability and
magnitude were the most important criteria, it would be a mistake to discard
other policy options. An anti-inflation toolkit can deploy multiple tools. That is
particularly true because interest rates do not require legislative involvement and
can be adjusted rapidly. Thus, legislatures and regulators can work to design and
implement price transparency, antitrust, and licensing solutions while the
Federal Reserve adjusts interest rates. Any portion of prices driven down by
market improvement laws can thereby prevent some portion of interest rate
increases and their side harms, while also making it more likely that some of the
main structural solutions to inflation actually work.
In short, once the criteria of direct magnitude, indirect structural support,
administrability, and side effects are all fully considered, policymakers would be
hard-pressed to find a more promising area than market improvement laws,
especially price transparency, to mobilize against inflation. The most important
conceptual takeaway is that anti-inflation analyses have historically paid too little
attention to the possibility that there are options that bring positive side effects.
Regardless of the magnitude, policy makers should do as much as possible with
laws offering side benefits to minimize the need to use those with side costs.
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Table I: Level of Attractiveness for Fighting Inflation

Interest rates
Price
Controls
Antitrust:
Breakups
Antitrust:
Price-fixing
Occupational
Licensing
Price
Transparency

Direct
Structural
Magnitude Support
High
Low

Administrability
HighMedium
Low

Side
Effects
Low

High

Low

Low

MediumLow
MediumLow
Low

Low

High

Medium

High

Medium

HighMedium

Medium

HighMedium
High

Medium
Medium
Medium

Low

B. Integrating Market Improvement Laws into Inflation Policy
Recognizing that an area of law should become a higher priority in an
inflationary period is an important conceptual step. However, deploying nontraditional anti-inflation tools poses a challenge of designing the institutional
integration of market improvement laws into inflation policymaking. There are
essentially two ways to go about this: creating new authority and changing the
way existing authority is exercised. The most powerful method would be to
create new authority. Most importantly, those developing responses to
inflation—especially lawmakers—should create new legal rules. However, even
without any new rules, a variety of existing actors can still have a potentially
meaningful impact by changing how they exercise existing authority. The
discussion that follows focuses on the subset of market laws that seem most
immediately promising—price transparency laws—but situates such reforms
within a more comprehensive market improvement strategy.
1. Creating New Laws
The review of the evidence above suggests that new legal rules can push
prices down. Accordingly, a straightforward way to integrate market
improvement laws into inflation policy would be to create legal rules that would
help consumers to obtain and analyze pricing information, remove unhelpful
licensing, and strengthen antitrust. It bears emphasis that state legislatures have
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passed many price transparency, antitrust, and licensing laws.204 Thus,
meaningful solutions need not wait for Congress.
In terms of institutional design, it would be suboptimal for lawmakers to
take the lead on writing all such legal rules. Given legislatures’ limited expertise,
as well as the general challenges of passing laws at the federal level and in many
states, it would be preferable for an administrative agency to be empowered to
study and enact market correction rules. The FTC is the logical choice among
existing agencies. It has a Bureau of Economics that can research and study the
price effects, as well as a Bureau of Consumer Protection that understands
consumer laws and a Bureau of Competition that enforces antitrust.205 Yet the
FTC has very little rulemaking authority related to market improvement laws.206
Therefore, Congress should empower the FTC and other administrative
agencies to write new market correction laws, even if only on a temporary basis
until inflation subsides.207 The highest priority legislation, and probably the most
politically viable, would be something like a broad-reaching Price Transparency
Act. The act would focus on giving consumers—and the digital intermediaries
that help them—the tools they need to easily locate the best deals. Such an act
has potentially widespread intellectual appeal because it leverages what is known
as “regulation for conservatives,” or behavioral interventions that would still
allow businesses and consumers to do what they want, rather than prohibiting
certain practices.208 Administrative agencies, such as the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau and the FTC, would then ideally study and write any new
rules not specifically outlined in the statute.
To decide which of many possible market improvement laws to pursue,
policymakers can apply the criteria of direct magnitude, indirect structural
support, administrability, and side effects. They should prioritize those laws that
have the strongest empirical support based on legislation enacted in other
countries or in U.S. states. They can also ask what interventions have worked in
some contexts, such as mandating price disclosures in grocery stores, that may
be worth trying in other contexts, like auto dealerships.
This prioritization analysis involves not just asking what types of law are
most appealing, but also which markets. In real terms, a dollar saved in gas
purchases is no different from a dollar saved in dry cleaning, but they are
potentially different in terms of inflation. To elaborate, consider how the price
of gasoline per gallon has a disproportionate impact on people’s perceptions of
See supra Part II.B.
Federal Trade Commission, https://www.ftc.gov (last visited July 12, 2022).
206 See Rohit Chopra & Samuel A.A. Levine, The Case for Resurrecting the FTC Act’s Penalty
Offense Authority, 170 U. PA. L. REV. 71, 74-75.
207 On the possibility of time-limited authority, see infra Part III.C.
208 See Colin Camerer, Samuel Issacharoff, George Loewenstein, Ted O’Donoghue &
Matthew Rabin, Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for “Asymmetric
Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1212 (2003).
204
205
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inflation.209 That is the case because gasoline prices are visible on billboards,
regularly paid by much of the population, and frequently reported in the
media.210 In reality, gasoline price changes overall contribute little to inflation
because they are a small part of overall consumer spending.211 However, because
expectations of inflation can lead to actual inflation, pushing down gasoline
prices can disproportionately help with lessening a direct cause of inflation.
Consequently, if gas prices are elevated in ways that price transparency laws
might address, devoting more resources to transparency rules for gas prices
would disproportionately help manage perceptions of inflation when compared
to the impacts of devoting similar resources to industries that have a weaker
psychological connection to inflation. Other products with outsized influence
on the perception of inflation, albeit to a lesser extent than gasoline, are food
and clothing.212 Targeting these industries would be one way to implement a
policy strategically designed to address the psychological side of inflation.
Space constraints do not allow for identifying each of the many specific legal
rules that might be enacted, whether individually or under a broad Price
Transparency Act. But the review of the literature above offers many promising
concrete examples. Those include the kind of price transparency laws that have
been demonstrated to work elsewhere, such as the Israeli grocery store statute
aimed at digital intermediaries and the Italian Parliament’s mandate of gas price
billboards.213
Lawmakers should not, however, limit themselves to those laws that have
already been implemented somewhere else. They can also look to promising
proposals in each area of market improvement laws. In the past, legal scholars
have proposed the types of laws that legislatures subsequently implemented to
lower prices. For instance, before the Israeli legislature passed the grocery store
disclosure law that ultimately lowered prices, Oren Bar-Gill had in other markets
proposed “smart disclosures” targeted at intermediaries rather than simply
directly at consumers.214
Sensible proposals can be found throughout the price transparency and
antitrust literatures. As for price transparency, Saul Levmore and Frank Fagan
have called for “mandated disclosure of past prices, and occasionally
Ariel Shwayder, Inflation Expectations and Gasoline Prices 1 (2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com /sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id=4131600.
210 See Shwayder, supra note 209, at 3.
211 See Shwayder, supra note 209, at 47. Of course, energy prices overall can influence a
broader array of areas of spending.
212 See Shwayder, supra note 209, at 47.
213 See supra Part II.
214 See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Stone, supra note 93, at 454-55 (proposing that cell phone companies
make personal usage data available to the customer in machine-readable form). A subsequent
proposal then built on Bar-Gill’s work to propose disclosures targeted at digital intermediaries
in retail goods, more in line with the eventual Israeli legislation. See Van Loo, supra note 147, at
1387.
209

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4226318

21-Jul-22]

Anti-Inflation Laws

45

settlements, where these have been negotiable,” which would help less
sophisticated consumers benefit from the better deals prior consumers
obtained, such as in the purchase of an automobile or loan.215
With the right political will, more aggressive reform would be warranted.
For instance, it would be worthwhile to prohibit some specific manipulative
practices, such as teaser rates for credit cards, as proposed by Ryan Bubb and
Oren Bar-Gill.216 Legislatures could also roll back the more unreasonable
licensing regimes, as proposed by David Hyman and Shirley Svorny.217
Although antitrust may be less appealing as an anti-inflation tool, scholars
have identified numerous antitrust reforms that are worth considering. Since
price-fixing is one of the more attractive areas in terms of the inflation criteria,
new legislation might target such practices, particularly those resulting from
algorithmic coordination. One noteworthy proposal is Michal Gal’s idea of
fighting companies’ algorithms with algorithms that would alert regulators to
violations or help consumers to exert pricing pressure on sellers.218 A number
of other proposals have been made, including Einer Elhauge’s call for cracking
down on potentially anticompetitive ownership structures, such as the same
mutual funds owning large portions of competing firms.219
Of course, the weaker the evidence supporting a proposal, the lower priority
that proposal is for policymakers. Particularly with many antitrust proposals, the
strongest support lies in theory, rather than empirics. For these types of
proposals, it is particularly important to study their impact after they are
implemented. It is also important to potentially build in a sunset provision
requiring the new rule to be reexamined empirically and reauthorized based on
that evidence after a certain number of years. Although there will often be
uncertainty due to limits on what is known, in many of these cases, the obstacle
seems to be politics rather than knowledge.220

215 Saul Levmore & Frank Fagan, The End of Bargaining in the Digital Age, 103 CORNELL L.
REV. 1469 (2018).
216 See Bar-Gill & Bubb, supra note 87, at 1001.
217 David A. Hyman & Shirley Svorny, If Professions Are Just “Cartels by Another Name,” What
Should We Do about It?, 163 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 101, 119 (2014) (“[L]egislatures should roll
back the existing licensing infrastructure, either by affirmatively eliminating existing licensing
boards or by sunsetting them and forcing the affected providers to periodically persuade a
majority of the legislature that licensure is deserved.”).
218 See, e.g., Michal S. Gal, Limiting Algorithmic Cartels, 38 BERKELEY J. OF L. AND TECH.
(forthcoming
2023)
(manuscript
at
3,
36),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4063081.
219 See Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267, 1267, 1316-17 (2016)
(concluding that horizontal shareholdings’ “harmful economic effects could and should be
reduced by using current antitrust law to challenge stock acquisitions that create anticompetitive
horizontal shareholdings.”).
220 See infra Part III.C. (discussing political economy constraints).
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2. Exercising Existing Authority More Aggressively
Many legal actors could shift their priorities, or change their legal decisions,
in ways that have the potential to bring down prices. These actors include
attorneys general, administrative agencies, and judges.
Consumer law scholars have shown how a variety of regulations in all fifty
states, and at the federal level, could discourage the kinds of pricing obfuscation
practices outlined above. The broadest-reaching move would be for attorneys
general, private plaintiffs, and the FTC to more aggressively exercise the Unfair
or Deceptive Acts and Practices (UDAP) authority that exists at the state and
federal level.221 Luke Herrine has argued that the FTC is sitting on potentially
awesome unfairness authority to promote fair dealing, but various legal actors
have retreated from exercising that authority due to industry lobbying.222 And as
Lauren Willis has demonstrated, unfairness case law can reach a range of digitally
deceptive practices that cause consumers to pay more.223 Whereas unfairness
authority comes with doctrinal uncertainty, another possibility lies in simply
devoting more energy to enforcing laws that clearly prohibit manipulative
pricing practices. For instance, David Friedman has documented how retailers
systematically fabricate a high price and then claim to discount it in order to
make it look like a bargain.224 They do this despite the fact that such practices
are illegal.225 Attorneys general, administrative agencies, and sometimes private
plaintiff-side attorneys could simply devote greater attention to an array of
existing laws that promote price transparency.
Judges and enforcers also have considerable discretion to expand existing
antitrust laws. Some existing proposals would directly target practices that have
a well-documented and significant impact on high prices. As one example, to
address pharmaceutical companies’ tactic of paying to delay competitive generic
entries, Scott Hemphill argued that such agreements should be “accorded a
presumption of illegality as unreasonable restraints of trade.”226
Other antitrust proposals would target anticompetitive behavior more
broadly. Fiona Scott Morton and Jonathan Baker argue that online platforms
violate antitrust laws when their contracts favor certain partners.227 Tim Wu and
Hemphill have called for judges to shift their thinking on firms’ “parallel
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
See Luke Herrine, The Folklore of Unfairness, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. 431, 528 (2021).
223 See Lauren E. Willis, Deception by Design, 34 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 115, 178 (2020).
224 David Adam Friedman, Reconsidering Fictitious Pricing, 100 MINN. L. REV. 921, 922–23
(2016).
225 See id.
226 C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design
Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1615 (2006).
227 Jonathan B. Baker & Fiona Scott Morton, Antitrust Enforcement Against Platform MFNS,
127 YALE L.J. 2176, 2176 (2018) (“Antitrust enforcement against anticompetitive platform most
favored nations (MFN) provisions… can help protect competition in online markets.”)
221
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exclusion” tactics, such as when Visa and Mastercard adopted rules that served
to block American Express from dealing with banks.228 Additionally,
Christopher Leslie has shown that “despite the fact that direct evidence of
collusion is rarely available, federal judges have made it harder to prove collusion
. . . by effectively requiring direct evidence . . . .”229
As discussed above, more structural interventions, such as breaking up large
firms, may not produce price results fast enough to warrant high priority. But if
antitrust enforcers credibly signal that they are willing to break up firms that
engage in anticompetitive pricing, or even begin to take such actions, it is
possible that the threat could immediately exert downward pressure on firms
fearing they will be targeted for such enforcement actions.230 Additionally,
whereas other interventions would have more immediate price effects, a few
targeted breakups or other significant antitrust remedies in major industries
might bring price relief three or four years down the line, after other market
improvement laws had reached their limits. They could thereby be part of a
more sustained anti-inflation strategy based on market improvements. The FTC
could at least experiment with such moves and study their price effects.
To be clear, legislation would be more likely to have an immediate, sustained,
and economy-wide impact on collusion and other problematic behavior than
solely increased enforcement of existing authority. But progress is also possible
if key legal actors, especially judges, simply update their outdated decisions in
accordance with market developments and advances in economic research.231
It is also worth noting that in the absence of any legislative action at the state
or federal level, some limited new legal rules, or at least policies, are still possible
through administrative agencies. To some extent this process is already
underway, with the National Economic Council and the White House pushing
seventeen agencies administering some form of competition policy to exercise
their full authority in matters related to pricing.232 For example, the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) voted to prohibit “sweetheart deals,” in
which landlords receive payments for allowing only a single Internet provider to
serve a building, significantly driving up prices for tenants.233 Therefore, a
C. Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu, Parallel Exclusion, 122 YALE L.J. 1182, 1192, 1251 (2013)
(“We reject this line of cases.”).
229 Leslie, supra note 124, at 1235.
230 Cf. Jo Seldeslachts, Joseph A. Clougherty & Pedro Pita Barros, Settle for Now but Block for
Tomorrow: The Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy Tools, 52 J.L. & ECON. 607, 630 (2009) (finding a
deterrence effect from blocked mergers but not settlement agreements).
231 For some of the tradeoffs involved in antitrust’s slowness, see Daniel A. Crane, Rules
Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49, 109 (2007).
232
See
White
House
Competition
Council,
WHITE
HOUSE,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/competition (last visited July 16, 2022).
233 News Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, FCC Adopts Rules to Give Tenants in
Apartments and Office Buildings More Transparency, Competition and Choice for Broadband
Service (Feb. 15, 2022), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-380316A1.pdf.
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diverse array of legal actors currently have at their fingertips the power to chip
away at inflation while improving markets.
3. Encouraging Action
Legal design tools could be deployed to increase the chances that diverse
legal actors overcome institutional inertia and political economy obstacles. This
section briefly explores two such tools: inflation impact statements and sunset
provisions.
Inflation Impact Statements. Since the contributors to prices are so dispersed,
and their additions to inflation are often opaque, many of the actors who can
individually play a part in addressing inflation may not feel sufficient democratic
pressure to do so. Or they may fail to undertake the analysis necessary to see
their potential impact on inflation because fighting inflation has not previously
been an obvious component of their job. A common tool for promoting
awareness and providing accountability in such situations is the impact
statement.
Impact statements are currently required, among other contexts, of
legislation that might have a detrimental impact on the environment.234 The idea
in environmental law is to compel lawmakers or administrative agencies to
consider the environmental impact of any new legal rules.235 In 1974, President
Ford issued an executive order requiring administrative agencies to study and
disclose the effects that their rules might have on inflation.236 It is worth
considering impact statements again today to pressure lawmakers and
administrative agencies to pay greater attention to how their actions may subtly
or unexpectedly influence inflation.
Inflation impact statements might also play a valuable role in incentivizing
action at the state level. The federal government could publish state-level
inflation reports that would show how inflation is progressing for each state.
The Bureau of Labor already collects pricing data from multiple sources in every
state as part of its inflation reports, and publishes some regional rates, so
publishing state-level inflation outcomes is not a big shift from current
practices.237 Such reports could put pressure on state-level legislators, attorneys
general, and agency leaders best positioned to remove unnecessary occupational
licensing laws and encourage the enforcement, or enactment, of price
transparency laws. A more aggressive version of reporting would be for federal
agencies to publicize the potential state-level inflation impact of taking certain
See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370e (2022).
See id.
236 See Exec. Order No. 11,821, 39 Fed. Reg. 41,501 (Nov. 29, 1974).
237 For one such report, see U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., CONSUMER EXPENDITURES IN
2012 8-9 (2014), http://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/cex/consumer_ expenditures2012.pdf.
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antitrust, licensing, or price transparency actions on local prices. Public reports
declaring that state legislators have the power to fight inflation with specific
steps would remove the current lack of pressure state actors may feel due to
their own ignorance, or due to voters’ inadequate knowledge of how such
microeconomic laws would affect inflation. Inflation impact statements would
thus foster greater integration of law and macroeconomics for the benefit of
society.
Sunset Inflation Laws. If lawmakers face political resistance to passing market
improvement legislation, sunset provisions may help. Sunset provisions ensure
that laws are revoked after a certain period of time—at which point,
metaphorically, the sun sets on the law. These provisions can be designed in
numerous ways, but in the case of inflation-oriented sunset laws one sensible
approach could be to state in the statute that the legal rules will end once
inflation reaches a moderate level for a certain duration, such as under 3 percent
for two years. Another approach would be to simply set a certain number of
years, such as ten years, after which the laws are no longer valid.
A better design would be to require an empirical assessment of the law’s
effects at the end of some period of time. After a certain number of years, the
new policy would be studied to determine its impact on inflation, burdens on
businesses, and broader influence on the economy. If it is found that the policy
is ineffective, perhaps because it fails to lower prices, it would be revoked.
Sunset provisions have already helped to overcome lobbying efforts to pass
price-reducing legislation previously. When Colorado legislators removed
funeral services licensing restrictions in 1983, they were met with warnings of
“significant threats to the public health, safety and welfare.”238 The legislature
responded to those concerns by including a sunset provision in the statute,
requiring a state agency to investigate the impact of the statute after several years
of operation to determine whether to continue the new policy.239
Ideally, the decisions to pass and keep market improvement laws would be
made based on informed studies of the laws’ impacts on markets. And if those
laws are overall beneficial to society in the long term regardless of inflation
levels, as would be expected from market improvement laws, then those laws
should remain. However, if political compromise is necessary, then it would be
preferable for market improvement laws to end with inflation than to not have
them at all when the stakes are so high.
CONCLUSION: INFLATION AS OPPORTUNITY
Once-in-a-generation threats such as alarming inflation require a pluralistic
See DEP’T OF REGUL. AGENCIES, OFF. OF POL’Y, RSCH. AND REGUL. REFORM , supra
note 201, at 16.
239 See Pizzola & Tabarrok, supra note 151, at 59.
238
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policy response involving all parts of the government—the executive, judicial
and legislative branches at both the state and federal levels. Diverse areas of law
should be leveraged to resolve the problem in a way that is as economically
productive as possible, rather than overwhelmingly relying on the Federal
Reserve to raise interest rates. Yet the dominant analytic framework for antiinflation law is currently an obstacle to designing such a comprehensive
response.
By not connecting law and microeconomics to the macroeconomic issue of
inflation, and by not considering the evidence of widespread market failures,
scholars have contributed to an underappreciation of the potential impact of
market improvement laws on price. They also have overlooked the ways that
price transparency laws can both lower prices in the short term and later provide
secondary support for direct structural solutions by helping consumers find the
best prices available in the marketplace once supply chains are no longer
decimated. These analytic shortcomings have contributed to an institutional
inflation inertia that erodes economic health and risks driving the economy
toward a recession.
Fortunately, a consensus in favor of market improvement laws may be
possible. The potential benefits of market improvement laws to society are
undeniable and embraced across much of the political spectrum. One reason
lawmakers have not always done everything they could to advance markets is
that consumers are such a dispersed group when compared to the concentrated
interests of corporations. That political economy means sensible market
improvement laws are not always passed or vigorously enforced during normal
times. Instead, throughout history, the political barriers to consumer reforms
have only been overcome by shocks such as the 2008 financial crisis.240 Earlier
periods of high inflation were no exception, driving lawmakers to increase
antitrust penalties in 1974.241 Although the political process has since become
more polarized, other bipartisan efforts are underway in a number of areas,
including gun control, privacy, and antitrust, all in response to extreme concerns
and events.242 Consequently, with the threat of a deeper recession looming, it is
not unrealistic to imagine inflation providing the necessary motivation to
overcome the political failures that otherwise prevent clearly beneficial market
See POLICY SHOCK, supra note 37.
See Handler, supra note 12, at 217 (calling new legislation the “first major reform of the
antitrust laws in almost 20 years.”). As another example, in 1969, the Republican Chairman of
the FTC reported to the Senate that in the midst of a “fight to eliminate the causes of inflation,
clearly one of the most important elements in this fight is the antitrust efforts to increase the
competitive efficiency of markets.” See Oligopoly and Inflation, 3 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV.
27 (1969) (quoting Chairman Caspar Weinberger, who was appointed to the FTC by President
Nixon).
242 See Ryan Tracy, Big Tech Antitrust Bill Backers Push for Vote, WALL ST. J., July 19, 2022, at
B1 (“The bill banning self-preferencing has been approved by the House committee and its
Senate counterpart, with support from many Democrats and a small group of Republicans.”).
240
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legislation.243
However, policy makers should not need the threat of a recession. A more
robust analytic framework for selecting anti-inflation laws would ideally push
key legal actors to start with those laws that bring beneficial side effects. Indeed,
since inflation tends to take years to address, different market improvement laws
can be pursued simultaneously, such as using price transparency laws to help
inflation within a year or two while structural antitrust interventions and
occupational licensing reforms would reach prices in subsequent years.
Although interest rate hikes would need to be used in parallel or shortly
thereafter, those hikes can be smaller or reversed more quickly because market
improvements will be simultaneously doing some of the inflation-reducing work
in the background.
Indeed, even if market improvement laws fail to play a meaningful role in
reducing inflation, such reforms would still prove societally beneficial. It is
independently important to reverse the alarming trend of businesses in recent
decades becoming more skilled at charging prices higher than justified by their
costs. Investing in improving markets is particularly important in the face of
evidence of a looming recession, since stronger markets can help lessen the
downturn’s severity and boost the ensuing economic recovery. Thus, inflation
could provide the keys to unlocking valuable legal reforms that would
significantly decrease economic inequality and increase total wealth in the long
run. Paradoxically, in the depths of inflation may lie an uplifting economic
opportunity.

243

Cf. Listokin, supra note 16, at 148 (“Law responds to pressing social problems.”).
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